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THIRD-CLASS CITIZENSHIP: THE
ESCALATING LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF
COMMITTING A “VIOLENT” CRIME
MICHAEL O’HEAR*
For many years, American legislatures have been steadily attaching a
wide range of legal consequences to convictions—and sometimes even just
charges—for crimes that are classified as “violent.” These consequences
affect many key aspects of the criminal process, including pretrial detention,
eligibility for pretrial diversion, sentencing, eligibility for parole and other
opportunities for release from incarceration, and the length and intensity of
supervision in the community. The consequences can also affect a person’s
legal status and rights long after the sentence for the underlying offense has
been served. A conviction for a violent crime can result in registration
requirements, lifetime disqualification from employment in certain fields,
and a loss of parental rights, among many other “collateral consequences.”
While a criminal conviction of any sort relegates a person to a kind of
second-class citizenship in the United States, a conviction for a violent crime
increasingly seems even more momentous—pushing the person into a
veritable third-class citizenship.
This Article provides the first systematic treatment of the legal
consequences that result from a violence charge or conviction. The Article
surveys the statutory law of all fifty states, including the diverse and
sometimes surprisingly broad definitions of what counts as a violent crime.
While the Article’s aims are primarily empirical, concerns are raised along
the way regarding the fairness and utility of the growing length and severity
of sentences imposed on “violent” offenders and of the increasingly daunting
barriers to their reintegration into society.
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INTRODUCTION
No federal statute has proven more of a jurisprudential quagmire for the
United States Supreme Court in recent years than the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA).
At first blush, the ACCA’s basic structure seems
straightforward enough: any person with three or more prior convictions for
a violent felony or serious drug offense who is found in possession of a
firearm is subject to a mandatory minimum prison term of fifteen years. But
the statute’s implementation has been bedeviled by a surprisingly complex
definitional problem: what counts as a “violent felony”? Time and again, the
Supreme Court has returned to this problem in order to resolve circuit splits.
For instance, in 2007, the Court decided that attempted burglary is a violent
felony. By contrast, in 2008, the Court ruled that the crime of driving under
the influence does not count as violent. The very next year, the Court
similarly held that the offense of failing to report for penal confinement is
not violent. In 2011, though, the Court decided that vehicular flight from a
law enforcement officer is violent. Then, in the 2015 case of Johnson v.
United States, in frustration with the seemingly endless ACCA litigation
bubbling up from the lower courts, the Court declared a key portion of the
statutory definition of “violent felony” to be unconstitutionally vague. The
majority opinion noted the “Court’s repeated attempts and repeated failures
to craft a principled and objective standard out of the [definitional
provision.]” Yet, even Johnson failed to stem the tide of ACCA cases. In
April 2018, the Court granted certiorari in Stokeling v. United States in order
to decide whether the crime of robbery, as defined in Florida law, counts as
violent.
While notable in its own right, the growing body of ACCA cases also
highlights a more generalized and increasingly important feature of
American criminal law: convictions for “violent” crimes—however the term
is defined—carry a unique weight relative to other convictions. For instance,
consider the ACCA in its legal context. Under federal law, a conviction of
any felony disqualifies a person from possessing a firearm, but the penalty
for violating this restriction is normally no more than ten years in prison, with
no mandatory minimum. However, if that felony is classified as “violent,”
and if there are two others so classified on the defendant’s record, then, by
virtue of the ACCA, the penalty balloons to a minimum of fifteen years and
a maximum of life.
Similarly, though with far less national visibility, state criminal codes
are full of their own sentence-enhancement provisions that are triggered by
prior convictions for “violence.” However, such recidivism statutes only
begin to scratch the surface of the special significance of a conviction (or
even just a charge) for a violent crime. Depending on the state, violent
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offenders may confront distinct procedural rules, special sentencing
provisions, disqualification from a wide range of jobs that are otherwise open
to individuals with felony convictions, disqualification from rehabilitative
treatment programs, and disqualification from opportunities to earn an
accelerated release from prison. By way of shorthand, I will refer to these
various legal consequences of a violence charge or conviction collectively as
categorical violence consequences, or “CVCs.”
As is well known, conviction of a crime—especially if it is a felony—
results in a sharp, multidimensional loss of legal status such that individuals
with convictions seem reduced to a sort of second-class citizenship.
Increasingly, though, the growing network of CVCs seem to impose on
violent offenders an even deeper loss of status than that which follows from
other convictions—a veritable third-class citizenship.
Constructed quietly in an ad hoc, piecemeal fashion over the course of
a generation, this third-class citizenship has received no sustained attention
from legal scholars. This Article thus constitutes a first effort to
systematically identify and assess the significance of the growing network of
CVCs.
The aims here are primarily empirical, not normative, although several
points of concern are noted along the way. A comprehensive critique and
reform proposal must await another day, but the present work lays a
necessary foundation by surveying and drawing attention to current legal
arrangements. Indeed, what is problematic about these arrangements cannot
be fully perceived without an appreciation of the number, scope, and
mutually reinforcing character of CVCs. For instance, viewed in isolation, a
particular employment disqualification for individuals who have a violentcrime conviction might seem reasonable enough, but when seen in relation
to a web of additional employment disqualifications, long mandatory
minimum prison terms, exclusions from potentially beneficial treatment
programs, and stigmatizing offender registration requirements, the same
CVC may be more properly viewed as one component of a system of laws
that collectively serve to hold a large group of former offenders in a
permanently degraded social status.
Although unique in its focus, this Article complements and draws
insight from four substantial, overlapping bodies of existing scholarship.
First, numerous authors have critically assessed recidivism laws, which
require longer sentences for repeat offenders, as in a “three strikes and you
are out” statute. Many, but not all, recidivism laws particularly target repeat
offenders who have been convicted of violent crimes. Such laws are a small,
but significant, part of the broader CVC phenomenon considered here.
Second, a growing body of research catalogs and critiques the so-called
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“collateral” consequences of criminal convictions. These are adverse legal
consequences, such as categorical bars to working in certain fields or
obtaining certain kinds of public benefits, that follow from a conviction, but
that are not formally part of the sentence. Many collateral consequences
apply broadly to any felony conviction, but some are expressly limited to
convictions for violent crimes. The latter collateral consequences constitute
another significant part of the CVC phenomenon. Third, many scholars have
evaluated some of the special legal consequences that can result from a
conviction for a sexual offense, such as registration requirements, residence
restrictions, and indefinite civil commitment. Sexual offenders face a set of
consequences that are, if anything, even harsher and more numerous than
those facing violent offenders—perhaps establishing a fourth-class
citizenship for them. Consequences that are specific to sexual crimes lie
beyond the scope of this Article, but it should be noted that some of the
criticisms that have been raised about these consequences—e.g., that social
isolation of offenders may increase rather than diminish their recidivism risk
—might also be applicable to some CVCs. Fourth, and finally, another body
of research assesses the impact of “justice reinvestment” reforms. Adopted
in more than two dozen states since 2004, these reforms have been premised
on the belief that public-safety outcomes could be improved if more
offenders were diverted from costly prison cells and the resulting savings
“reinvested” in evidence-based rehabilitative treatment programs and other
crime-prevention initiatives. Despite some notable successes, the justice
reinvestment movement has thus far fallen well short of expectations in
reducing incarceration. One important weakness has been the tendency for
reforms to draw sharp, categorical distinctions between violent and
nonviolent offenders, excluding the former from the new divert-and-treat
paradigm and thus contributing to the broader network of CVCs.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part I canvasses
the wide range of statutory definitions of “violent crime,” “violent offense,”
and “violent felony” that have been adopted by different states for CVC
purposes. Importantly, many such definitions sweep in large numbers of
offenses that lie outside core understandings of what constitutes violence.
Part II highlights other ways in which CVCs can have an unexpectedly wide
reach. For instance, depending on the state, CVCs might be triggered by a
misdemeanor conviction, a juvenile adjudication, or an old conviction of an
individual who has been crime-free for many years or even decades. Part
III, the heart of the article, provides a thorough, fifty-state overview of
statutory CVCs. The consequences are divided into five major categories:
pre-conviction, sentencing, corrections, juvenile, and collateral. Part IV
briefly turns to the normative, outlining potential concerns with CVCs in the
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areas of fair notice, proportionality in punishment, and efficacy in protecting
public safety. Finally, Part V concludes with a consideration of potential
next steps that could be taken to begin addressing the concerns.
Before proceeding, a word about terminology is in order. The Article
makes frequent use of terms like “violent crime” and “violent offense.”
These terms are meant to refer to crimes that fit into the relevant jurisdiction’s
legal definition of “violent crime” (or “offense”)—which may include crime
that lies outside ordinary understandings of what is violent. In other words,
the terms are used not in their lay sense, but in a technical legal sense.
Similarly, the term “violent offender” here refers to the individuals who are
subject to a CVC based on the supposed commission of a crime that is legally
categorized as “violent.” The term is not meant to indicate that the person
has a propensity to engage in any particular kind of criminal misconduct. Put
differently, while “violent offender” seems commonly used in political
rhetoric and media reporting as a synonym for “dangerous criminal,” that
usage is not the one that is employed here. Some of the individuals who are
labeled “violent” for our purposes are probably quite dangerous, but others
are surely not.
I. WHAT MAKES A CRIME “VIOLENT”?
States have adopted a wide variety of different statutory definitions for
“violent crime” and related terms. Based on their structure, the definitions
can be divided into three categories: qualitative, laundry list, and hybrid.
A. QUALITATIVE STATUTORY DEFINITIONS

Qualitative definitions, which are the least common, distinguish
“violent” from other offenses based on the presence of certain generic
characteristics. An Arkansas statute supplies a helpful illustration, defining
“crime of violence” as “any violation of Arkansas law in which a person
purposely or knowingly causes, or threatens to cause, death or physical injury
to another person, specifically including rape.”1 This seems a reasonably
clear, focused definition marking out a core set of offenses that most people
would likely recognize as “violent.”
Other statutes reach more broadly. An Arizona statute, for instance,
defines “violent crime” as “any criminal act that results in death or physical
1
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-42-203 (2017). For another similar formulation, see, e.g., N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.2-01(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“Crime of violence
means any violation of state law where a person knowingly causes or threatens to cause death
or physical bodily injury to another person or persons.”).
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injury or any criminal use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.”2
Like the Arkansas definition, Arizona’s includes physical injury as a
component, but without the mens rea constraints; read for all it is worth, the
Arizona language might treat some accidental injuries as acts of violence.
The contrast here marks an important fault line: as we will see, states vary as
to whether and in what circumstances they include unintentional injuring in
their definitions of violence. Note, too, another important difference between
the Arkansas and Arizona laws: even in the absence of a physical injury, the
Arizona statute would still treat as violent any crime involving the use of a
“deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” The underlying idea seems to be
that “violence” should include conduct that has an objectively dangerous
character, without regard to whether any physical injury was actually caused
or intended.
A qualitative definition from California highlights additional fault lines.
Under this statute, a “crime of violence” is “an offense that has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another.”3 The California law is broader than the Arkansas
definition along two dimensions. First, it turns on a use of force, rather than
an injury. Although the concepts overlap, force can be used against a person
without intending or causing injury—think, for instance, of physically
restraining another person. Second, and even more importantly, the
California definition includes offenses that are directed solely against
property, as contrasted with those directed against persons. Although it is
conventional to distinguish violent from property offenses, the California
statute, like others we will consider below, blurs the distinction.
B. LAUNDRY LIST DEFINITIONS

Purely qualitative definitions inevitably present interpretive problems
and raise concerns that defendants, lawyers, and others may not be able to
determine in advance of litigation which CVCs apply to whom. In order to
avoid such uncertainties, many statutory violence definitions take the form
of a list of specific offenses, often with statutory cross-references so that there
can be no doubt about which offenses the legislature meant to classify as
violent. Some lists include little more than a handful of offenses, while others
run to mind-numbing length.

2

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901.03 (2010).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 423.1(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Reg. Sess.)
(emphasis added).
3
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1. List Content
A relatively narrow list that seems in the spirit of the qualitative
Arkansas statute—that is, mostly sticking to a core, consensus set of
“violent” crimes—comes from Georgia, which defines “serious violent
felony” to include these seven offenses:
 Murder (including felony murder);
 Armed robbery;
 Kidnapping;
 Rape;
 Aggravated child molestation (involving either physical injury
to the victim or, in some circumstances, sodomy);
 Aggravated (forcible) sodomy; and
 Aggravated sexual battery (nonconsensual penetration with a
foreign object).4
By contrast, Delaware’s list of “violent felonies” includes no fewer than
eighty-four offenses.5 While that list appears to be the longest, several others
include twenty or more.6 The longer lists, not surprisingly, tend to include a
number of offenses that seem to lie outside the violent crime core. Consider
a few examples.
Burglary. Burglary is commonly included in laundry list statutes.7
Such an inclusion has great practical significance, for burglary is a relatively
common offense. For instance, the number of burglary arrests in the United
States far exceeds the combined total number of arrests for murder, rape, and
robbery.8 Treating burglary as a violent offense may follow from that
particular concern for property interests that we saw in the California
qualitative statute, which associated “crime of violence” with a use of force
against “the person or property of another.”9 However, burglary may also be
seen as an offense with a more serious character than most other property
crimes. This distinctive character comes from the common-law definition of

4

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-6.1 (West 2014).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4201 (2015).
6
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-706(F)(2) (2017) (listing twenty-four offenses in
definition of “violent or aggravated felony”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501(d)(2) (2017) (listing
twenty-six offenses in definition of “felony involving violence”).
7
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501(d)(2)(A)(xi) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4201; IND. CODE § 35-50-1-2(a)(14) (2016).
8
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at tbl. 18
(2017).
9
CAL. PENAL CODE § 423.1(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Reg. Sess.)
(emphasis added).
5
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burglary as the breaking and entering of a dwelling.10 Arguably, such a
criminal act relates to the core, assaultive violent offenses in two ways. First,
an invasion of the dwelling may feel like such a profound intrusion into one’s
private space as to seem almost like a violation of one’s bodily integrity.
Second, if the burglar encounters a resident within the dwelling, there is apt
to be a physical confrontation between the two. Yet, while it may be easy to
see why the burglary of a dwelling might be classified alongside offenses like
rape, robbery, and assault, most contemporary burglary statutes are drafted
more broadly so as to cover entry into any “building” or “structure,” and
some reach even vehicles and vending machines.11 In recognition of this
breadth, some—but by no means all—of the laundry list statutes that include
burglary specifically limit the “violent” classification to aggravated forms of
the offense, such as armed burglary or burglary of an occupied dwelling.12
Larceny (Theft). If burglary, at least as traditionally defined, seems only
a slight step removed from the consensus core of “violent crime,” larceny
(also known as theft) represents a much greater extension from the core.
Larceny need not involve any invasion of a private space, nor any substantial
risk of physical confrontation.13 Yet, several laundry list statutes specifically
include larceny.14 This not only rejects the conventionally recognized
distinction between violent and property crime, but also subjects a much
larger number of individuals to CVCs. In 2016, for instance, there were more
than one million larceny arrests in the United States, a number that far
outstripped the combined total arrests for burglary, murder, rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault.15
Drug Offenses. In some respects, drug offenses seem even further
removed from core understandings of violence than does larceny: drug
offenses do not have a victim in the conventional sense of the term, but
instead target uncoerced transactions and the personal possession or use of
controlled substances. Nonetheless, several laundry list statutes classify

10

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 21.1 (5th ed. 2010).
Id. § 21.1(c).
12
See, e.g., § 511.020 (defining burglary in the first degree as burglary committed while
armed, burglary causing a physical injury, or burglary involving the use or threatened use of
a “dangerous instrument”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.200(3) (2010) (defining “violent
felony offense” to include burglary in the first degree).
13
See LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 19.2(i) (noting that trespass element of theft can be
satisfied even if property not removed from presence or premises of another).
14
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-202(1)(K) (2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS tit. 12, § 12-1.52(8) (West 2012).
15
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 7 at tbl. 18.
11
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some drug offenses as violent.16 This doubtlessly reflects certain practical
connections thought to exist between drug crimes and core violence. For
instance, it is known that individuals who are arrested for core violent
offenses test positive for drug use at a much higher rate than the general
population.17 However, such correlation does not prove causation, and more
rigorous research has generally failed to find evidence of a direct causal link
between drug use and violent behavior.18 The more important drug-violence
connection lies in the use of force to settle trafficking-related disputes, given
the inability of drug dealers to utilize the normal legal mechanisms for
resolving business-related conflict.19 For any particular drug transaction,
though, physical harm is merely a risk, and possibly a rather remote one at
that. Thus, when drug offenses are characterized as “violent” for CVC
purposes, the definition seems to embrace an especially expansive risk-based
definition of violence and to dispense with the aggravated mens rea as to
physical injury that is required, for instance, in the Arkansas qualitative
statute.20
Sexual Offenses. Nearly all of the laundry list statutes include sexual
offenses.21 This is not surprising because some sexual offenses, particularly
rape and other aggravated sexual assaults, plainly lie within the core
understanding of violence. However, the listed sexual offenses also
sometimes include crimes that do not necessarily involve physical injury or
the use or threatened use of force. For instance, some form of “statutory”

16
See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 35-47-4-5(b)(24)–(28) (2017) (defining “serious violent felony”
to include dealing or manufacturing certain controlled substances); MINN. STAT. § 624.712(5)
(2015) (defining “crime of violence” to include felony-level drug offenses); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-145.5(a)(5) (West 2017) (excluding from “nonviolent” definition offenses involving
cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamines).
17
Jeffrey A. Miron, Drug Prohibition and Violence, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTRODUCTION AND CRIMINALIZATION 99, 106 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
18
Id. at 106–07.
19
See id. at 100–01, 112.
20
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-42-203 (2017) (including in definition of “crime of violence”
that “person purposely or knowingly causes, or threatens to cause, death or physical injury to
another person”) (emphasis added). Note that the term “threatens” (found in the Arkansas
definition alongside the conventional mens rea terms “purposely” and “knowingly”) is also
often interpreted in criminal law so as to include a mens rea component. See, e.g., Elonis v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (holding that conviction under federal threat
statute requires proof that defendant’s purpose was to transmit threat, that defendant knew
communication would be viewed as threat, or perhaps that defendant was reckless in this
regard; mere negligence is not sufficient).
21
For a rare counterexample, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-301(2) (West, Westlaw
through May 21, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (defining “crime of force or violence” to mean
aggravated assault, robbery, and aggravated burglary).
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rape is commonly a listed offense.22 This crime involves sexual contact with
a person below a particular age without regard to that person’s consent.
Depending on the state, statutory rape may include a wide range of conduct
of widely varying harmfulness and culpability.23 For instance, a good-faith
mistake of age might not be available as a defense, while liability might be
triggered by superficial, clothed contact, or by contact between
contemporaries or near-contemporaries in a romantic relationship.24 Beyond
statutory rape, some laundry lists also include the distribution of images of
underaged individuals engaging in (or possibly just simulating) sexual
activity,25 possession of child pornography,26 or the display of one’s private
parts to a minor.27 All of this conduct is, of course, undesirable and can
sometimes involve extremely serious victimization. Other times, however,
the character of the conduct may differ quite substantially from core
understandings of violence.
Other. Many more examples could be supplied of offenses that might
strike some readers as odd or unexpected to find on a list of “violent crimes.”
These include, for instance:
 Neglect of a patient, child or impaired adult28;
 Escape29;

22
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-706(F)(2)(i), (k) (2017) (defining “violent or
aggravated felony” to include sexual conduct with a minor and molestation of a child); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4201(c) (2015) (defining “violent felonies” to include unlawful sexual
contact in the second degree (contact with person under eighteen)); MINN. STAT. § 624.712(5)
(2015) (defining “crime of violence” to include criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree,
which includes various age-based sexual offenses).
23
See LAFAVE, supra note 42, § 17.4(c) (describing variation in state statutory rape laws).
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4201(c) (2015) (defining “violent felonies” to
include dealing in child pornography); IND. CODE § 35-50-1-2(a)(17) (2016) (defining “crime
of violence” to include child exploitation); WIS. STAT. § 939.632 (2016) (defining “violent
crime” to include sexual exploitation of a child).
26
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 571 (1976).
27
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(d)(1)(e) (West 2016) (defining “violent career
criminal” to include those convicted three times of lewd or lascivious exhibition); cf. WIS.
STAT. § 939.632 (2016) (defining “violent crime” to include causing a child to see or listen to
sexual activity).
28
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4201 (2015) (patient, impaired adult); MINN. STAT.
§ 624.712(5) (2015) (child); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5(c)(i)(K) (West 2018) (child with
disability).
29
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4201 (2015); IND. CODE § 35-47-4-5(b)(19) (2017);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(9)(a) (West 2017).
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Driving under the influence30;
Carrying a concealed weapon31;
Unlawful possession of an explosive, chemical, or incendiary
device32;
 Violation of an order of protection33;
 Extortion34;
 Inducing panic, defined as causing a “serious public
inconvenience or alarm” by, inter alia, circulating a false report
of a fire, explosion, or crime35; and
 Attempting to dissuade a witness from giving testimony.36
To be sure, all of these offenses do encompass some highly culpable,
harmful conduct, but their elements are sufficiently broad as to sweep in
additional conduct that does not involve an intent or threat to cause physical
injury to another.37

30
See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-2(c-1) (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 973-2(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through laws from the 2018 Reg. Sess. effective through June 29,
2018).
31
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4201 (2015); WIS. STAT. § 939.632 (2016).
32
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5(c)(i) (West 2018).
33
See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-2(c-1) (West 2015).
34
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4201 (2015).
35
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2917.31(A), §§ 2901.01(9)(a). (West 2017).
36
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(9)(a) (West 2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 135:17-b(II)(g) (2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5702(1)(iii) (2017).
37
From a drafting perspective, the basic dilemma is this: there are some offenses that are
often committed in ways that fit core understandings of violence, but that can be committed
without the sort of conduct that would generally be recognized as violent. For instance, the
crime of escape from a detention facility could be accomplished by shooting one’s way out
(violent) or by sneaking out through a tunnel (nonviolent). A potential solution would be to
specify that offenses like escape only count as “violent” when they are committed in certain
ways (e.g., through the use or threatened use of force) or otherwise cause physical injuries.
However, this approach would present practical challenges insofar as it would require a court
or agency to make determinations about the facts underlying a conviction, which could require
obtaining old records from another jurisdiction. Even then, especially if the conviction was
obtained without trial via a guilty plea, the court record may be too sparse to support reliable
judgments about key facts related to the crime. Additionally, the process might become more
cumbersome still to the extent that a person’s jury-trial rights were triggered by this factfinding. Although there is no right to have a jury determine the existence of prior convictions,
there may be such a right with respect to underlying facts. See Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13, 25 (2005) (for purposes of determining whether a prior conviction counts as a
“burglary” under the ACCA, indicating that judicial fact-finding regarding the manner that the
crime was committed would raise “serious risks of unconstitutionality”).
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2. The Federalism Problem
There is a subtle, but sometimes quite important, federalism problem
with laundry-list definitions: a person living in one state may have an out-ofstate conviction that seems pertinent for CVC purposes, but the other state’s
substantive criminal law may not match up well with the home state’s
definitional schema. This can create uncertainty for everyone involved—the
offender, courts, correctional authorities, potential employers, and so forth—
and there is no entirely satisfactory way to resolve the difficulty. If a state’s
definition of violent crime is simply a list of statutory references to specific
provisions in its own criminal code, then out-of-state convictions would
never trigger a CVC no matter how clearly they are encompassed within the
spirit of the definition. Yet, even laundry lists that provide offense names
(“murder,” “robbery,” etc.) instead of just statutory references can present
problems: some offenses carry different names in different states (e.g.,
“larceny” and “theft”), while other offenses have the same name but
substantially different elements. Recall, for instance, that some modern
burglary statutes are much broader than the common-law offense of burglary,
but others continue to employ the traditional approach.38
In order to deal with such difficulties, laundry list statutes often
expressly include out-of-state convictions for offenses that are substantively
similar to the listed in-state offenses. For instance, an Arkansas definition of
“serious felony involving violence” includes any “[c]onviction of a
comparable serious felony involving violence from another jurisdiction.”39
Likewise, an Indiana definition of “serious violent felon” includes
individuals with a conviction in “any other jurisdiction in which the elements
of the crime for which the conviction was entered are substantially similar to
the elements of a serious violent felony [under Indiana law].”40 Meanwhile,
in Minnesota, “violent crime” includes violations of specified Minnesota
statutes “or any similar laws of the United States or any other state.”41 Such
provisions introduce some potentially helpful flexibility into the laundry list
statutes, but at the cost of exacerbating uncertainties in the application of
CVCs. Terms like “comparable” and “substantially similar” may leave much
room for interpretive debate in specific cases.

38
39
40
41

Supra Part I.B.1.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501(c)(2)(B) (2017).
IND. CODE § 35-47-4-5(a)(1)(B) (2017).
MINN. STAT. § 609.1095(1)(d) (2014).
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C. HYBRID STATUTES

Hybrid statutes combine a laundry list with qualitative provisions.
Structured in this way, a statutory definition can ensure that certain specific
offenses of particular concern are treated as “crimes of violence,” while
preserving flexibility for the inclusion of additional unlisted offenses of a
similar character. This saves drafters the trouble of combing the criminal
code for every pertinent offense and of continually updating the statutory
definition as offenses are added, deleted, renamed, renumbered, or otherwise
modified.
The federal ACCA provides a good example. The statute defines
“violent felony” as follows:
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . .42

The relatively brief ACCA laundry list includes burglary, arson, and
extortion—all common, but not universal, items on other lists—while the
qualitative components add to these specific offenses any other offenses that
have a force-related element or that present “a serious risk of physical
injury.” (The latter component constitutes the so-called residual clause that
was found void for vagueness in Johnson v. United States43; the other
portions of the definition remain legally operative.) The qualitative
provisions echo themes that we have seen in other qualitative statutes: use or
threat of force against another person, risk of physical injury, and use of
explosives.
In principle, hybrid statutes seem to offer the best of both worlds,
providing the flexibility of qualitative definitions while still giving certainty
as to some offenses. Each hybrid statute strikes the balance a little
differently, though. With only three specifically listed offenses, the ACCA
skews toward flexibility and—much to the Supreme Court’s chagrin—away
from certainty. By contrast, a Louisiana hybrid statute includes within the
definition of “crime of violence” more than fifty specific offenses, plus any
other offense that has a specified type of physical force element or that
involves the possession or use of a dangerous weapon.44

42

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012). Omitted language includes certain juvenile
adjudications within the definition.
43
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
44
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(B) (2017).

2019]

THIRD-CLASS CITIZENSHIP

179

D. FAULT LINES

Whether structured in qualitative, laundry list, or hybrid form, statutory
definitions of “violent crime” differ substantially in their scope from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and even sometimes from statute to statute within
a single jurisdiction.45 Although there are numerous specific offenses that
appear in some definitions and not in others, most of the variation can be
located along one of two fault lines. First, there is the question of
intentionality, that is, whether an offense must include a conscious intent to
injure in order to count as “violent,” or whether it is enough that the offense
conduct actually did injure or at least created a risk of injury (e.g., drug
distribution, escape, carrying a concealed weapon). Second, there is the
question of physicality, that is, whether the harm in view must be to a
person’s body—in the form of physical injury, or perhaps more broadly
understood to include restraint of movement or sexual contact—or whether
harm to a property interest suffices (e.g., larceny or expansive versions of
burglary or extortion).
Some statutes seem, implicitly or explicitly, to adopt intentionality and
physicality as necessary requirements for a crime to be considered
“violent.”46 More commonly, however, statutes reflect a comparatively
relaxed view as to one or both of the criteria, leading to correspondingly more
expansive definitions of “violent crime.” 47 Sweeping in offenses that lie
beyond the core understanding of violent crime, these statutes raise concerns
about fair notice and proportionality in punishment, as discussed in Part IV
below.
II. OTHER DEFINITIONAL DIMENSIONS OF “VIOLENT CRIME”
In addition to the various competing approaches to defining what counts
as “violent,” there are several other important dimensions of variation as to
what can trigger a CVC. One may again note statutes that seem surprisingly
expansive.

45

Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-42-203 (2017) (qualitative definition), with ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-4-501(d)(2) (laundry-list definition in different statute from same jurisdiction).
46
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-42-203 (2017) (defining “crime of violence” as “any
violation of Arkansas law if a person purposely or knowingly causes, or threatens to cause,
death or physical injury to another person, specifically including rape” (emphasis added)).
47
As Alice Ristroph has cautioned, “[T]he term ‘violence’ extends beyond actual bodily
injury; it becomes an abstraction, and eventually that abstraction may become a repository for
all we find repulsive, transgressive, or simply sufficiently annoying.” Alice Ristroph, Criminal
Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571 at 575 (2011).
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A. OFFENSE SEVERITY: FELONY VERSUS MISDEMEANOR

While most CVCs require a felony-level offense, a sizeable minority
can be triggered by just a misdemeanor. Sometimes this is made explicit in
the CVC statute.48 In other laws, it can be harder to tell whether and to what
extent the law reaches misdemeanors. For instance, if a statute employs a
laundry-list definition, some digging through the state’s criminal code may
be required to appreciate the full range of offense severities that are included.
Ohio’s definition of “offense of violence” provides a good illustration. The
laundry-list portion of this hybrid definition includes references to no fewer
than thirty-seven separate sections of the criminal code,49 a few of which do
describe misdemeanor offenses.50 As to statutes with qualitative definitions,
the full reach of the law may require judicial interpretation, but it does seem
reasonably clear in many instances that misdemeanor-level violent crimes are
intended to trigger the consequences at issue.51
The inclusion of misdemeanors in CVC statutes may raise a number of
concerns. For instance, on the face of things, a statute that treats felonies and
misdemeanors in an undifferentiated fashion may seem overbroad and
insufficiently attentive to important differences in offense severity.

48

In several states, for instance, a person is statutorily barred from working as a driver in
a transportation network (i.e., Uber and its competitors) after being convicted of a
“misdemeanor violent offense.” See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-8-25(3)(b) (West, Westlaw
through 2018 Reg. Sess. laws effective through June 29, 2018). Likewise, in several states,
such a conviction will preclude a person from obtaining a permit for the concealed carrying
of a firearm. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104 (West, Westlaw through all chapters
effective May 1, 2018, Budget Session). Similarly, some sentence-enhancement statutes are
expressly triggered by misdemeanor convictions that qualify as “violent.” See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE § 18-3325(3) (West, Westlaw through all immediately effective legislation of the 2d
Reg. Sess. of the 64th Legislature) (“Use of a conducted energy device during the commission
of any of the following misdemeanor crimes of violence . . . shall result in double the penalties
provided for in the Idaho Code regarding those crimes.”). Other statutes are expressly
structured so as to limit some opportunity, benefit, or protection only to individuals with a
misdemeanor charge or conviction that is nonviolent. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2521(a)
(West, Westlaw through June 7, 2018, Reg. Sess.) (restricting strip searches of individuals
arrested for nonviolent misdemeanors).
49
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(9)(a) (West, Westlaw through File 66 of the 132d
G.A. (2017–18)).
50
See id. at §§ 2903.22(B), 2917.03, 2917.31, 2921.04(A).
51
Often, for instance, statutes will specify that a consequence follows from an arrest or
conviction for a felony or a crime of violence. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 985.04(4)(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.) (“[W]hen a child of any age is taken into custody . . .
for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult, or a crime of violence,
the law enforcement agency must notify the superintendent of schools . . . .”). If the term
“crime of violence” were limited to felonies, of course, it would be an unnecessary redundancy
to include it in such statutes.
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Additionally, because we normally expect misdemeanor penalties to be
relatively mild and short-term, there are more likely to be fair-notice
problems with CVCs that are triggered by these lower-level offenses.
Finally, as a matter of both legal doctrine and practical reality, the procedural
safeguards for defendants tend to be far weaker in misdemeanor than felony
cases.52 The title of a critical report on misdemeanor case-processing in
Florida is telling: “Three-Minute Justice.”53 This relative lack of due process
in many misdemeanor cases might caution against attaching an extensive set
of legal consequences to the resulting convictions.
B. OFFENDER AGE: ADULT CONVICTIONS VERSUS JUVENILE
ADJUDICATIONS

In the United States, crimes by young people are normally handled
through a juvenile court system that has distinctive procedures and methods
of sanctioning.54 Even a different terminology is used to describe outcomes:
a youth found responsible for criminal conduct in the juvenile system is
“adjudicated delinquent” instead of “convicted.”55 In general, the juvenile
system is less formal and more oriented to offender rehabilitation than the
adult system.56 These differences have seemed appropriate in light of certain
distinctive tendencies of young people. The pertinent research has been
summarized this way:
Youths differ from adults in risk perception, appreciation of consequences, impulsivity
and self-control, sensation-seeking, and compliance with peers. The regions of the brain
that control reward-seeking and emotional arousal develop earlier than do those that
regulate executive functions and impulse control. Adolescents underestimate the
amount and likelihood of risks, emphasize immediate outcomes, focus on anticipated
gains rather than possible losses to a greater extent than adults, and consider fewer
options. . . . Researchers attribute youths’ impetuous decisions to a heightened appetite
for emotional arousal and intense experiences, which peaks around 16 or 17.57

52
See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTRODUCTION AND CRIMINALIZATION 71, 72 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (“[T]he misdemeanor
world operates by its own peculiar and often disturbing rules. Enormous, fast, and highly
informal, the system sweeps up and processes millions of people in ways that diverge wildly
from traditional criminal justice ideals.”).
53
ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEFENSE LAWYERS, THREE MINUTE
JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2011).
54
See O’HEAR, supra note 22, at 135, 140
55
Id. at 135.
56
Judi McMullen, Invisible Stripes: The Problem of Youth Criminal Records, 27 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 9 (2018).
57
Barry Feld, Juvenile Justice, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTRODUCTION AND
CRIMINALIZATION 329, 384–85 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
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Such tendencies have obvious implications for the blameworthiness,
deterrability, and amenability to rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.58
Despite the “softer,” more rehabilitative orientation of the criminal
justice system toward juvenile crime as a general matter, violent juvenile
crime can trigger quite different responses. As we will see below, juveniles
facing violence charges may be transferred to the adult system, and, even if
they remain in the juvenile system, are apt to encounter less favorable
treatment there.59 Even beyond these consequences, though, a sizeable
number of CVC statutes treat violence adjudications on the same footing as
violence convictions.60 Thus, for instance, a violence adjudication can lead
to categorical employment bars,61 prohibitions on gun ownership,62 and
exclusion from opportunities for early release from prison.63 A violence
adjudication may also trigger a mandatory minimum sentence in a
subsequent case64 and lead to a person’s inclusion on a violent offender
registry.65
Using juvenile adjudications in these sorts of ways raises concerns that
parallel those raised by the use of misdemeanors: important differences in
offense severity are potentially disregarded; fair notice may be lacking; and
the relative informality of juvenile courts may diminish the reliability of guilt
determinations.66 Even beyond these, there may also be additional concerns

58
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–75 (2010) (concluding, based on distinctive
characteristics of young people, that penological goals of retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation cannot justify imposition of sentence of life without the
possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses).
59
Infra Part III.D.
60
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-2-403(e) (West, Westlaw through May 21, 2018, 2d
Reg. Sess.) (“Conviction by a criminal court or adjudication by the juvenile court for . . . an
offense involving violence against any person . . . shall disqualify such [a] person from
employment with, or from having any access whatsoever to adults in, an adult day care
center . . . .” (emphasis added)).
61
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-3-42 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. laws,
March 23, 2018) (employment as law enforcement officer); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-3507(e)(1)(A)(i) (employment in childcare agency).
62
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(d) (West, Westlaw through Act 23 of 2018
Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(c)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective June 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.).
63
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.0513(6) (West, Westlaw through June 18, 2018, Reg. Sess.)
(early release for successful completion of drug treatment).
64
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.8(4) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
65
IND. CODE § 11-8-2-13(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-5-1513(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through the 2017 Sess.).
66
A particular reliability concern for juveniles is that their immature decision-making
processes may leave them more likely than adults to plead guilty to crimes they did not
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about subjecting a group of offenders as to whom rehabilitative hopes tend
to be highest to long-term legal disadvantages that may hinder their ability to
reintegrate as productive, law-abiding members of society.
C. CONSEQUENCES IN THE ABSENCE OF CONVICTIONS

Not all CVCs require a conviction. Juvenile adjudications are just one
example of what may suffice in lieu of a conviction. Most notably, many
legal consequences can be triggered by a mere charge for a violent offense.
Typically, these consequences relate to the pre-conviction litigation process.
These are detailed below in Part III.A. However, a violence charge can carry
a variety of additional consequences. Some are only temporary over the time
period that the case is pending. For instance, a Kentucky statute regulating
residential psychiatric treatment centers mandates that “[a]ny employee or
volunteer who . . . is charged with the commission of a violent offense . . .
shall be immediately removed from contact with a child within the residential
treatment center until the employee or volunteer is cleared of the charge.”67
Other CVC statutes establish consequences of a more lasting nature.
For instance, a Louisiana statute establishes a presumption against granting
an explosives license based on a person’s arrests or charges for a violent
crime,68 while an Arkansas statute provides for the denial or revocation of a
polygraph examiner license on the basis of a violence arrest or indictment.69
Meanwhile, an Arizona statute requires a probationary sentence for certain
drug offenders unless they have a prior indictment for a violent offense.70
Similarly, Louisiana has an expedited parole mechanism for certain
prisoners, but requires additional process for those who initially faced a
violence charge.71
A few CVC statutes can also be triggered by a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity.72 And, in a similar spirit of expansiveness, some CVC

commit. Rebecca K. Helm et al., Too Young to Plead? Risk, Rationality, and Plea
Bargaining’s Innocence Problem in Adolescents, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 180 (2018).
67
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 216B.457(12)(a) (West, Westlaw through the end of 2018 Reg.
Sess.) (emphasis added).
68
LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1472.3(E)(2)(o).
69
ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-39-211(10) (West, Westlaw through laws effective June 14, 2018
in the 2018 Fiscal Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.).
70
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901.01 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Spec. Sess.,
and legislation effective May 16, 2018 of the 2d Reg. Sess.).
71
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.2(4)(a)(ii) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
72
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.123(2) (2016) (imposing mandatory minimum prison
term for armed violent felony if the defendant was previously convicted, adjudicated
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statutes can be triggered even by convictions that have been formally sealed
or expunged.73
D. AGE OF CONVICTIONS

Most CVC laws lack any sort of “statute of limitations” by which a
person’s old violent offenses would lose their legal effect after a period of
time.74 This may seem especially draconian with respect to juvenile
adjudications—youthful missteps thereby carry lifetime consequences, even
though the offense was not seen as so serious at the time as to warrant
prosecution in an adult court.75
The minority of CVC laws that do contain time constraints incorporate
varying limitations periods. At one extreme are a few CVCs that expire three
years after the completion of the sentence.76 At the other end of the scale are
a set of CVCs that do not expire until ten years have elapsed from the
conviction or sentence.77
The social science research suggests that a statute of limitations would
be appropriate for violence convictions, and that the optimal length may be
something less than a decade. As convictions age, they become progressively

delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect as to another violent
felony).
73
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-38-105(c)(3) (providing for permanent disqualification
from employment in child care facility on basis of violent offense “whether or not the record
of the offense is expunged, pardoned, or otherwise sealed”).
74
The lifetime impact of convictions is implicit in most CVC statutes, but is sometimes
made express. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-90-111(9)(b) (2015) (“[A] person is
disqualified from employment [by department of human services] either as a department
employee or as an independent contractor, regardless of the length of time that may have
passed since the discharge of the sentence imposed for any of the following criminal offenses:
(I) A crime of violence . . . .” (emphasis added)).
75
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.245(b) (West, Westlaw through June 18, 2018,
Reg. Sess.) (“A person who was adjudicated delinquent for . . . a crime of violence . . . is not
entitled to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm for the remainder of the person’s
lifetime.”).
76
These and the other time limits at the shorter end of the scale are almost all tied to
misdemeanor convictions and serve to restore firearms-related rights to the covered
misdemeanants. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.06(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg.
Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. laws
effective through June 29, 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.47(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018
Reg. Sess. emergency legislation).
77
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.0513(2)(6) (setting as condition for opportunity for
early release from prison that “the offender has not within the past ten years been convicted
or adjudicated delinquent for a violent crime . . . .”).
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less reliable predictors of future behavior.78 For instance, one leading study
found that the recidivism risk of a person who last offended six or seven years
earlier is only a little higher than that of otherwise similar individuals who
have no criminal record at all.79 Slight differences in risk between two groups
of people hardly seem a compelling justification for relegating one group to
a third-class citizenship.
III. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF A “VIOLENT CRIME”
This Part presents a fifty-state survey of the legal consequences of a
violence charge or conviction. The research strategy used here likely
captured a large share of the nation’s CVCs, although a few limitations
should be noted. In particular, the search was limited to state statutory law.
Thus, for instance, administrative regulations, local ordinances, and federal
law were omitted, all of which may include CVCs of various sorts; recall, for
instance, the ACCA as an example of a federal CVC. Also, not included in
the discussion that follows are consequences attached to “sexual violence,”
“domestic violence,” and “gang violence”; those are distinct, statutorily
recognized offense categories in some states that present their own distinct
problems of law and policy. Further methodological details and limitations
are set forth in the footnotes.80

78
See, e.g., Megan Kurlychek, Shawn Bushway & Robert Brame, Long-Term Crime
Desistance and Recidivism Patterns—Lessons from the Essex County Convicted Felon Study,
50 CRIMINOLOGY 71, 96 (2012) (“Our starting point is the widespread understanding—based
on decades of recidivism studies—that the risk of offending tends to decline with the passage
of time since the last offense.”).
79
Megan Kurlychek & Shawn Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old
Criminal Record Predict Future Offending, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 483 (2006).
80
Using the Westlaw database, the following terms and connectors search was conducted
in the codified statutes of each of the fifty states: (!violen! or nonviolent) /2 (crime or offense
or felony or misdemeanor). As indicated in the text, statutes dealing exclusively with “sexual
violence” (or related terms like “sexually violent offender”), “domestic violence,” or “gang
violence” were disregarded. Additionally, I disregarded substantive offense definitions in
which the word “violence” or “violent” appears as an element of the offense (e.g., disorderly
conduct statutes that prohibit “violent” behavior); substantive offense definitions in which an
intent to commit a violent crime appears as an element of the offense; legislative findings or
declarations that have no legally operative effect; death penalty statutes that list prior violent
convictions as an aggravating circumstance; statutes that apply only to a single county or other
geographic subdivision of a state; statutes that establish limited pilot programs; court rules;
special procedures for violent crime cases that do not clearly create a disadvantage for the
defendant; statutes that create CVCs only with respect to cases with a child victim; and victim
rights and compensation statutes. Note also that the search was not designed to identify statutes
creating consequences for a “forcible felony,” a “crime against the person,” a “serious felony,”
or an “act of violence,” although these terms are sometimes used in ways that seem roughly
synonymous with “violent crime.”
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Even with these limitations, the survey makes clear that individuals with
charges or convictions for “violent crimes” are subject to a large number and
wide diversity of legal consequences, with about 600 CVCs cited and
categorized in this Part. These CVCs affect all stages of the criminal process:
pre-conviction, sentencing, and corrections. There are also a number of
CVCs that apply specifically to juvenile offenders, and many that operate
outside the criminal justice system entirely. By way of overview, the table on
the next two pages indicates which states have at least one CVC in each of
fifteen categories. These categories correspond to the subsections of this Part.
Table 1. States with at least one CVC in each category.
Pretrial
Release
AL

Pretrial
Diversion

Other Preconviction

Sentencing
Alternatives to
Incarceration

Sentence
Enhancements

X

X

Other
Sentencing

Release
from
Prison

X

AK
AZ

X

AR

X

CA

X

CO

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

CT
DE

X

X
X

X

FL

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

GA

X

X

X

X

X

HI

X

X

X

X

X

ID

X

IL

X

X

IN

X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

IA
KS

X

KY
LA

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

MD

X

X

X

X

X

MA

X

X

ME

MI

X

MN
MS

X
X

X
X

MO

X
X

X

X

X

NE

X

X

X

X
X

X

MT

NV

X

X

X
X

X

X
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Other
Sentencing

X

NJ

X

NM

X

X

NY

X

X

NC

X
X

X

Release
from
Prison
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

ND
OH
OK

X
X

OR
PA

X

RI

X

SC

X

X
X

SD

X

TN

X

TX

X

X
X

VT

X

VA

X
X

WV
WI
WY

X

X

UT

WA

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X
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Table 1 (continued). States with at least one CVC in each category
Community

Other

Juvenile

Supervision

Corrections

Specific

AL

Work

X

X

X

X

Privacy

Guns &

Other

&

Parenting

Related

Collateral

Stigma

Items

AK
AZ

X

AR

X

CA

X

X

CO

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

CT
DE
FL

X

GA

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

HI

X

ID

X

IL
IN

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
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A. PRE-CONVICTION CVCS

1.

Pretrial Release

In more than a dozen states, statutes make it categorically harder for
violent offenders to obtain pretrial release and remain in the community
while they wait for their cases to be resolved.81 Several different mechanisms
are utilized. For instance, some states require that special procedures be
followed or standards applied before a violent offender can be released on
his or her own recognizance (i.e., without having to put up cash bail). 82

81

The states are identified in the first column of the table, see supra Table 1. The specific
statutes are cited in the remaining footnotes of this section.
82
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1319(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Reg. Sess.):
No person arrested for a violent felony . . . may be released on his or her own
recognizance until a hearing is held in open court before the magistrate or judge, and
until the prosecuting attorney is given notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard
on the matter.
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Moreover, when money is required for release, a few states mandate that the
judicial officer who determines the amount must take into account whether
the defendant is facing a current violence charge (or, in one state,83 has ever
merely been arrested for a violent felony).84 In ten states, a violence charge
or conviction, in conjunction with other factors, may cause a defendant to be
held under a preventive detention law without access to bail release at any
dollar amount.85 Meanwhile, in two states, a defendant facing a violence
Id. See also § 1319(b):
A defendant charged with a violent felony . . . shall not be released on his or her own
recognizance where it appears, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she
previously has been charged with a felony offense and has willfully and without excuse
from the court failed to appear in court as required while that charge was pending.
Id. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2107(c) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018, Chs.
200-262) (“[F]or a defendant charged with committing a violent felony involving a firearm or
with committing a violent felony while on probation or pretrial release, the presumption is that
a conditions of release bond guaranteed by financial terms secured by cash only will be set.”
(effective Jan. 1, 2019)); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-12(a)-(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act
562) (defining “bail restricted offense” to include, inter alia, a “serious violent felony” and
imposing special procedural requirements before person charged with such offense can be
released on own recognizance); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 321(C) (West, Westlaw
through the 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (“Any defendant who has been arrested for any of
the following offenses shall not be released on his personal undertaking or with an unsecured
personal surety . . . (1) A crime of violence . . . .”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.032
(West, Westlaw through the 2017 Reg. and First Called Sessions of the 85th Legis.)
(establishing presumption that certain defendants with mental illness or intellectual disability
will be released on personal bond, but only if “the defendant is not charged with and has not
been previously convicted of a violent offense”); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.19.170 (West,
Westlaw through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (mandating on-the-record
explanation when defendant arrested or charged with violent offense released on personal
recognizance); § 10.21.015(2):
A pretrial release program may not agree to supervise, or accept into its custody, an
offender who is currently awaiting trial for a violent offense . . . who has been convicted
of one or more violent offenses . . . in the ten years before the date of the current
offense, unless the offender’s release before trial was secured with a payment of bail.
Id.
83
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967(B) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Special
Sess., and legislation effective May 16, 2018 of the 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring judicial officer
to take into account whether accused has prior arrest or conviction for violent felony).
84
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(c) (“Before a court reduces bail to below the amount
established by the bail schedule . . . for a person charged with . . . a violent felony . . . , the
court shall make a finding of unusual circumstances and shall set forth those facts on the
record.”).
85
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961(D) (prohibiting bail if court finds “clear and
convincing evidence that the person . . . engaged in conduct constituting a violent offense”
and other factors are present); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-101(1) (2015) (mandating that “[a]ll
persons shall be bailable” except if violent crime has been charged and certain other
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charge loses the ability to regain pretrial release if he or she engages in certain
forms of (not necessarily violent) misconduct while out on bail.86 Finally,
one state generally precludes pretrial release in any pretrial program for
defendants who have had a violent felony conviction in the past ten years.87
2.

Pretrial Diversion

In about two dozen states, a current violence charge or a prior conviction
for a violent offense will categorically disqualify a defendant from at least
one pretrial diversion program.88 Such programs offer defendants an
opportunity to avoid incarceration and often even a conviction. The
circumstances present); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1 (establishing rebuttable presumption for
detention if defendant “charged with a serious violent felony and has already been convicted
of a serious violent felony”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 804-3(c) (West, Westlaw through Act
23 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (establishing rebuttable presumption for detention if defendant has
prior conviction of “serious crime involving violence against a person” in past ten years, or is
already on bail, probation, or parole for such an offense); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276,
§ 58A(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 108 of the 2018 2d Annual Sess.) (authorizing pretrial
detention for defendant who was convicted of a violent crime if certain other conditions
satisfied); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5-202(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective June 1, 2018, from the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (establishing rebuttable presumption for
detention if defendant charged with crime of violence and has prior conviction for crime of
violence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:1-d (I) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 159 of the 2018
Reg. Sess.) (establishing presumption against bail if probable cause to believe that defendant
committed a specified crime while “on probation or parole for a conviction of a violent
crime”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1101(C) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess., 1st
Extraordinary Sess. and Ch. 17 of the 2d Extraordinary Sess.) (“All persons shall be bailable
by sufficient sureties, except that bail may be denied for 2. Violent offenses . . . .”); WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.21.050 (“The judicial officer must, in determining whether there are
conditions of release that will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the
community, take into account . . . (1) . . . whether the offense is a crime of violence . . . .”);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 969.035(2)(b) (2016) (authorizing pretrial detention of “person accused of
committing or attempting to commit a violent crime [if] the person has a previous conviction
for committing or attempting to commit a violent crime”).
86
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2116(b) (requiring revocation of bail if person charged
with violent felony committed another offense during period of release); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 312(B):
A person released on a previously posted bail undertaking for . . . a crime of
violence . . . which carries a minimum mandatory sentence of imprisonment upon
conviction . . . shall not be readmitted to bail when the person previously failed to
appear and a warrant for arrest was issued and not recalled or the previous bail
undertaking has been revoked or forfeited.
Id.
87

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1105.3(C)(4) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess., 1st
Extraordinary Sess. and Ch. 17 of the 2d Extraordinary Sess.).
88
The states are identified in the second column of the table supra Table 1. The specific
statutes are cited in the remaining footnotes of this section.
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programs typically require the defendant to enter into some form of
rehabilitative treatment or specialized supervision in return for the
suspension of regular criminal proceedings.89
For instance, a violent crime can affect eligibility for a drug treatment
court (DTC). These courts provide an alternative to conventional caseprocessing for drug-involved defendants.90 If admitted to a DTC, the
defendant receives drug treatment in the community under court supervision.
Not all participants have success,91 but, for many, the DTC provides a
beneficial structure for treatment, leading to lower levels of drug use,
recidivism, and incarceration. For instance, recent research indicates that the
recidivism rates of DTC participants are about 7.5 to 14% lower than those
of similar defendants who are not in a DTC.92 In short, for some defendants,
disqualification from a DTC can be a major disadvantage. Yet, despite the
ability of DTCs to support desistance from drug use and crime, ten states
preclude DTC entry for violent offenders.93
89
See, e.g., Jonathan P. Caulkins & Mark A. R. Kleiman, Drugs and Crime, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 275, 301 (Michael Tonry, ed. 2011) (“Drugdiversion programs . . . involve offering drug users arrested either for drug possession or for
non-drug crimes the opportunity to avoid a fail or prison sentence in return for agreeing to
enter, and remain in, drug treatment.”).
90
O’HEAR, supra note 22, at 27.
91
Id. at 33.
92
Id. at 34.
93
Nine states disqualify on the basis of a current violence charge. See ALA. CODE § 1223A-5(i)(1) (West, Westlaw through Act 2018-579); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-98-303(c)(1)(A)
(West, Westlaw through laws effective June 14, 2018 in the 2018 Fiscal Sess. and 2d
Extraordinary Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 948.08 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 2d Reg. Sess.);
IDAHO CODE § 19-5604(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through all immediately effective legislation of
the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 64th Legis.); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 166/20(b)(1) (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 100-590, with the exception of P.A. 100-586, of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 9-23-15(1)(b)-(c) (West, Westlaw through laws from the 2018 Reg. Sess.
effective through June 29, 2018); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-39.2(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through
Ch. 30 of the Jan. 2018 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-130(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through
2018 Act No. 177); W. VA. CODE § 62-15-6(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through legislation of the
2018 Reg. Sess.). A mostly overlapping set of nine states disqualify on the basis of a prior
violence conviction. See ALA. CODE § 12-23A-5(i)(2); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-98303(c)(1)(B); IDAHO CODE § 19-5604(2)(a); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 166/20(b)(4); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 9-23-15(1)(a); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-39.2(d)(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-130(A)(2);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-254.1(H) (West, Westlaw through legislation of the 2018 Reg. Sess.);
W. VA. CODE § 62-15-6(a)(3). This does not include states that offer grants to support locally
operated DTCs but condition the money on the exclusion of violent offenders—a less direct
approach to try to keep violent offenders out of the treatment courts. See, e.g., WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 165.95(3)(c) (2016).
To be sure, a DTC is not the only way of structuring a diversion for drug treatment, but
other programs also often include statutory exclusions for violent offenders. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1000(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
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The success of DTCs has inspired a proliferation of other sorts of
specialized “problem-solving” or “therapeutic” courts.94 However, violence
exclusions are also common among these courts. For instance, five states
exclude violent offenders from their specialized mental health courts,95 while
three states exclude violent offenders from their veterans’ courts.96 Another
state, Washington, more broadly excludes from all therapeutic courts those
defendants “who are currently charged or who have been previously
convicted of a serious violent offense,” absent “special findings” by the
court.97
State laws authorize a wide range of other kinds of diversion programs,
with the terminology and structural details varying considerably from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Across all of this diversity, though, violence
exclusions remain a common theme.98
301/40-5; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 903.1 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st
Extraordinary Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-229 (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective June 1, 2018, from the 2018 Reg. Sess.); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 16.23 (West, Westlaw through the 2017 Reg. and First Called Sessions of the 85th Legis.).
94
O’HEAR, supra note 22, at 57–58.
95
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-100-205; FLA. STAT. § 948.01(8)(a); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
168/20(b)(1); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5355(B)(2)(f) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st
Extraordinary Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-130(A). A growing body of research finds that
mental health courts have had success in reducing recidivism and violence rates. See Lauren
Gonzalez & Dale E. McNiel, Can Reduced Homelessness Help to Explain Public Safety
Benefits of Mental Health Court?, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 271, 271 (2018).
96
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/20(b); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-25-1(e); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:4326(2) (West, Westlaw through L. 2018, c. 23 and J.R. No. 5).
97
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.30.030(3)(a) (West, Westlaw through all effective legislation of
2018 Reg. Sess.).
98
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-904(b)(2)(B) (excluding from pre-adjudication probation
defendants charged with a violent felony); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4218(c)(1)(b) (West,
Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018, chs. 200-262) (excluding from “probation before judgment”
certain defendants based on prior conviction of violent felony); FLA. STAT. § 948.08(2)
(excluding from pretrial intervention program defendants who have a prior violent
misdemeanor conviction); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-6-3.3(a-2) (excluding from offender
initiative program defendants charged with violent offense); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-63.6(b) (excluding from First Time Weapon Offender Program defendants whose offense was
committed during commission of violent offense or who have prior conviction, conditional
discharge, or juvenile delinquency adjudication for a violent offense); IND. CODE § 11-12-3.711(a)(2)(A), (3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (excluding from preconviction
forensic diversion program defendants who are either charged with violent offense or who
have conviction in past ten years for violent offense); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5401(B)(1)(f), (h)
(excluding from workforce development sentencing program defendants charged with a crime
of violence); § 15:571.44(F) (same for job intervention program); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1526(1)(a) (empowering court generally to withhold acceptance of guilty plea “pending
successful completion of such conditions as may be imposed by the court,” but excluding
cases of violent crime); § 99-15-107(A) (excluding from pretrial intervention program
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Other Preconviction CVCs

Even beyond affecting the possibility of pretrial release and diversion,
a current violence charge or past violence conviction can carry a variety of
other preconviction consequences for defendants. In six states, for instance,
there are special rules for violent offenders who are found incompetent to
stand trial.99 Other CVCs eliminate affirmative defenses100 or permit
prosecutors to avoid the normal consequences of their own neglect.101 In
Kansas, individuals arrested for a misdemeanor normally have statutory
protections against strip searches, but only if the misdemeanor was
nonviolent.102 In New York, there are special restrictions on the extent to

defendants charged with violent crime); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16A-4(A)(1) (West, Westlaw
through May 16, 2018 of the 2d Reg. Sess.) (excluding from diversion program defendants
with prior conviction for violent felony); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 215.10 (McKinney through
L. 2018, Chs. 1 to 72) (excluding cases from possibility of dispute resolution referral if
defendant charged with violent felony); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.36(A)(2) (West,
Westlaw through File 66 of the 132d G.A. (2017–18)) (excluding from pretrial diversion
programs individuals accused of violent offense); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-22-50 (excluding from
pretrial intervention program defendants charged with violent crime); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§ 164(a) (West, Westlaw through Acts of the Adjourned Session of the Vt. G.A. effective
through May 25, 2018) (authorizing diversion project “designed to assist adults who have been
charged with a first or second misdemeanor or a first nonviolent felony” (emphasis added));
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.3(B)(iii) (excluding defendants with prior violence conviction from
domestic violence diversion program unless prosecutor does not object); A.B. 470
§ 2(2)(a)(1), 2017 Leg., 79th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017) (excluding from diversion program
defendants charged with violent misdemeanor).
99
See FLA. STAT. § 916.145(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 2d Reg. Sess.)
(establishing longer waiting period before dismissal of current charge if incompetent
defendant has prior violent felony conviction); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-130(c) (West, Westlaw
through 2018 Act 562) (establishing longer potential period of civil commitment if
incompetent defendant charged with violent offense); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-406
(West, Westlaw through Act 23 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (capping length of potential
institutionalization for incompetent defendant only if charge was for nonviolent
misdemeanor); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-107(a) (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective June 1, 2018, from the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (establishing longer waiting period before
dismissal of charge if charge was for felony or violent crime); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A1003 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Reg. Sess.) (requiring, if incompetent
defendant was charged with violent crime and ordered committed, that law-enforcement
officer “take the defendant directly to a 24-hour facility”).
100
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.23(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Reg. Sess.)
(human trafficking not defense to violent crime); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-8(I) (no statute of
limitations for first degree violent felony).
101
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1387.1(a) (providing state with additional opportunity to refile
violence charge dismissed based on excusable neglect by prosecution).
102
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2521(a) (West, Westlaw through June 7, 2018 Reg. Sess.).
Washington has a similar rule. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.79.130(2)(a) (West, Westlaw
through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
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which violence charges can be reduced through plea bargaining.103 A number
of other CVCs affect pretrial processes.104 And, even at trial, the rules of
evidence can be different when violence is charged, with prosecutors
permitted in several states to use certain kinds of hearsay or other evidence
that would otherwise be excluded.105
B. SENTENCING-RELATED CVCS

1.

Alternatives to Conventional Incarceration

In about two dozen states, violent offenders are categorically excluded
from one or more sentencing alternatives to conventional incarceration.106
For instance, in five states, violent offenders cannot be sentenced to home
detention (house arrest).107 In three, violent offenders are excluded from
community service.108 In nine, violent offenders cannot take advantage of

103

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10(d) (McKinney through L.2019, chs 1–19).
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 813(e)(1) (prohibiting prosecutor from requesting
summons in lieu of arrest warrant to bring suspect before court in cases of violent crime); .LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 320(D) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.)
(requiring drug test of individuals arrested for crime of violence);
105
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3516(a) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018 chs.
200–262) (out-of-court statements made by impaired adult or patient or resident of a state
facility); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-901 (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective June 1, 2018 from the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (statements from declarant who is unavailable
due to wrongdoing); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02, subdiv. 4(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through June
18, 2018 Reg. Sess.) (out-of-court testimony from child); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-221
(West, Westlaw through the 2017 Sess.) (out-of-court statements made by person with
developmental disability); § 46-16-220(1) (out-of-court statements made by child); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-505(3)(a) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective April 24, 2018 2d Reg.
Sess.) (providing that husband-wife privilege may not be claimed in “criminal case where the
crime charged is a crime of violence . . . committed by one against the person or property of
the other or of a child of either”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.210(4)(c) (recognizing exception
to general rule against use of intercepted communications in certain prosecutions for serious
violent offense); § 9A.44.150(a) (out-of-court testimony from child). Additionally,
Maryland’s prosecutors have a special right to appeal adverse evidentiary rulings in cases
involving a crime of violence. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-302(c)(4)(i).
106
The states are identified in the fourth column of the table supra; the specific statutes
are cited in the remaining footnotes of this section.
107
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-27.8-101(1) (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4391(3)
(West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018 chs. 200–262); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.210(1)
(West, Westlaw through the end of 2018 Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-1004 (West,
Westlaw through the 2017 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.734(1)(a) (West, Westlaw
through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
108
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-302(2)(a); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 8-703
(West, Westlaw through legislation effective June 1, 2018 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9920-5 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. laws effective through June 29, 2018).
104
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particular sentencing options involving a drug treatment component.109 In
three, violent offenders are excluded from particular sentencing options
involving a work or job training component.110 Many additional sentencing
alternatives in other states are subject to similar limitations.111
Probation, in the form of either a suspended or deferred sentence, is the
most basic alternative to incarceration, and, in several states, a current or past
conviction of a crime categorized as violent can limit a defendant’s eligibility

109
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901.01(B) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st
Special Sess. and legislation effective May 16, 2018 of the 2d Reg. Sess.) (probation with
mandatory drug treatment defendant); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174.4(a)(2)(R) (West, Westlaw
through ch. 13 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (program for female defendants with drug problems who
are either pregnant or parenting young children); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-103.5(4)(a)
(probation option in which felony drug conviction can be reduced to misdemeanor); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-622.5(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Act 23 of 2018 Reg. Sess.)
(probation with treatment); IND. CODE § 11-12-3.7-4(4) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
Sess.) (forensic diversion program); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5304(B)(10)(b)-(c) (West, Westlaw
through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (drug division probation program); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 559.115(4) (West, Westlaw through emergency legislation approved June 1, 2018 2d Reg.
Sess.) (“If the offender is convicted of a class C, class D, or class E nonviolent felony, the
court may order probation while awaiting appointment to treatment.” (emphasis added));
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.660(1)(c) (drug offender sentencing alternative); W. VA.
CODE § 62-15-6a(a) (West, Westlaw through legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (treatment
supervision). In at least two other states, a violent offense is a statutory factor that militates
against, but does not categorically bar, a treatment-based alternative. See FLA. STAT.
§ 921.0026(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.) (downward sentencing departure
for assignment to drug court); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-1304 (West, Westlaw through all
chapters effective May 1, 2018 Budget Session) (probation with treatment).
110
See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1(g)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act 562) (work
release program); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170/15 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-590, with
the exception of P.A. 100-586, of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (job training program); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 83-4, 143 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective April 24, 2018 2d Reg. Sess.)
(work camp).
111
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 6228 (restitution center); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-1003
(intensive supervision); § 99-37-19 (restitution center); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 410.91(2)
(McKinney through L.2019, chs. 1–19)) (parole); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-5620.2(a)(3)(i) (West, Westlaw through ch. 30 of Jan. 2018 Sess.) (community confinement);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-36-106(a)(1)(C), (F) (West, Westlaw through May 21, 2018 2d Reg.
Sess.) (community-based alternatives to incarceration); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.655(1)(b) (parent sentencing alternative); § 9.94A.670(2)(c) (sex-offender
sentencing alternative). In Montana, only when it comes to nonviolent felony offenders is the
sentencing judge mandated “first [to] consider alternatives to imprisonment of the offender in
a state prison.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-225(1). Likewise, Washington law mandates, “For
sentences of nonviolent offenders for one year or less, the court shall consider and give priority
to available alternatives to total confinement and shall state its reasons in writing on the
judgment and sentence form if the alternatives are not used.” § 9.94A.680 (emphasis added).
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for a probationary sentence.112 This is structured a bit differently from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For instance, Kentucky and Louisiana generally
ban probation for violent offenders.113 California prohibits probation for
defendants convicted of a violent felony who were already on probation at
the time of the violent offense.114 In Illinois, the law encourages probationary
sentences for certain felonies, unless the defendant has a prior conviction for
a violent crime.115 Illinois also excludes violent offenders from “second
chance probation,” which offers the possibility of dismissal of the underlying
charge if probation is successfully completed.116 Similar laws can also be
found elsewhere.117 Of course, the most direct and common way for a
legislature to preclude probation is by requiring a mandatory minimum
prison term; many such minimums for violent offenders are noted in the next
subsection.
In addition to community-based alternatives, several states also offer the
option of intensive, “boot-camp” incarceration.118 Such programs involve
relatively short periods of incarceration and also often include drug
counseling and other rehabilitative programming.119 However, the governing
statutes in six states categorically exclude violent offenders from boot-camp
sentences.120

112

See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.047 (generally prohibiting probation for violent
offenses).
113
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.047; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893(A)(b)(2) (West,
Westlaw through the 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.). The Louisiana statute recognizes an
exception for certain first-time offenses.
114
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(k).
115
See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4-1(b-1).
116
See id. at 5/5-6-3.4(a-1).
117
For instance, Georgia excludes “serious violent offenders” from a program similar to
Illinois’s. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-6.1(b)(3), 42-8-60(i)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act
562). For other examples of restrictions on probation, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.15
(West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Special Sess. and legislation effective May 16, 2018 of
the 2d Reg. Sess.) (precluding probation for defendants convicted of violent crime committed
under the influence of drugs); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-12 (West, Westlaw through
2018 Reg. Sess. laws, March 23, 2018) (precluding probation for second or subsequent
conviction for violent crime).
118
O’HEAR, supra note 22, at 49–50 (2018) (describing development and spread of boot
camp concept).
119
SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE AND NON-SENSE ABOUT CRIME, DRUGS, AND COMMUNITIES
267–68 (7th ed. 2011).
120
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-27.7-103(1) (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6705(b)(2)(3) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018 chs. 200–262); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 865(1)
(McKinney through L.2019, chs. 1–19); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-2.2(d)(1) (West,
Westlaw through ch. 30 of Jan. 2018 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-316.1 (West, Westlaw
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Sentence Enhancements

Enhancement statutes increase the otherwise-applicable sentencing
range for an offense by mandating a certain minimum term of imprisonment,
increasing the maximum potential term that can be selected by the sentencing
judge, or both.121 More than two dozen states have adopted enhancement
statutes that are in some sense triggered by “violent” offenses.122
Recidivism statutes, which base the enhancement on a defendant’s prior
conviction (or, in some instances, convictions), are the most common. For
instance, in New York, a felony drug offender with a prior felony conviction
faces higher minimum and maximum terms if the prior was classified as
violent.123 Similarly, several states enhance sentences for particular weapons
offenses if the defendant has a prior violence conviction.124 A variety of

through legislation of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.690(1)(a)(ii)
(West, Westlaw through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
121
The maximum can be increased directly or indirectly. The maximum is increased
indirectly if the enhancement statute creates a separate offense for committing a predicate
violent offense in a particular way or in particular circumstances. The overall sentencing
exposure is increased if the new offense has a higher maximum than the predicate, or if its
existence creates opportunities for prosecutors to obtain two convictions based on the same
underlying criminal conduct with sentences that can be ordered to run consecutively.
122
The states are identified in the fifth column of Table 1 supra; the specific statutes are
cited in the remaining footnotes of this section.
123
The precise sentencing impact of the prior violent felony depends on the severity of
the current drug conviction. For instance, if the current conviction is for a class B felony, then
a prior violent felony results in a sentencing range of between six and fifteen years. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70.70(4)(b)(i) (McKinney through L.2019, chs. 1–19). By contrast, if the prior
felony was nonviolent, then the applicable range would be only two to twelve years.
§ 70.70(3)(b)(i). Additionally, if the prior felony was nonviolent, the sentencing judge would
be permitted to impose a sentence of probation or parole supervision. § 70.70(3)(c)-(d).
124
In three states, for instance, penalties are enhanced for felon-in-possession offenses if
the defendant had a prior violent-crime conviction. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-103(c)(1)
(West, Westlaw through laws effective June 14, 2018 in the 2018 Fiscal Sess. and 2d
Extraordinary Sess.); IND. CODE § 35-47-4-5(c) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.29 (4m)(a) (2016). Similarly, Massachusetts enhances penalties for
offenses involving silencers, tear gas, or carrying a loaded firearm while under the influence.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10G(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 108 of 2018 2d
Annual Sess.). Additionally, three states enhance penalties for the possession or use of a
machine gun if the weapon was possessed or used for an “aggressive or offensive purpose,”
and establish a presumption of such a purpose if the defendant has a prior violent-crime
conviction. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-204, 205(a)(2); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-405
(West, Westlaw through legislation effective June 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-8-304-05 (West, Westlaw through the 2017 Sess.).
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other specific offenses are also subject to enhancement in certain states based
on a violent prior.125
Even more common than these recidivism statutes that are triggered by
a specific current offense are more generally targeted statutes that impose
enhanced penalties when a defendant has a certain number of convictions for
crimes classified as violent. Such statutes are typically labeled as “repeat,”
“habitual,” or “persistent” offender laws. (Some also go by the more
colloquial “three strikes and you are out” label.126) They are found in some
version in close to half the states,127 albeit with wide variation in the technical
details.128 Although terms like “persistent” or “habitual” violent offender
125

ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-211 (assault on law enforcement officer); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 2303 (West, Westlaw through Acts of the Adjourned Session effective May 25, 2018)
(murder); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.235 (strangulation); § 940.32 (stalking).
126
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2001) (discussing
development of “three strikes” laws in Washington and California).
127
I count here only the laws in which “violent crime,” “violent felony,” or a close cognate
is treated as a legally relevant category. There are many additional habitual criminal laws that
do not distinguish between violent and nonviolent offenses.
128
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-706(B) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st
Special Sess. and legislation effective May 16, 2018 of the 2d Reg. Sess.) (three convictions
for “violent or aggravated” felonies); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through
ch. 13 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“defendant has one or more prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions”); § 667(e)(2)(A) (current felony conviction and at least two prior convictions for
a “serious and/or violent felony”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-801(1)(a) (2015) (three
convictions for “class 3 felony that is a crime of violence” or particular drug felonies); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018 chs. 200–262) (three
convictions of “violent felony”; subsections (b)-(d) establish other enhancements for various
combinations of violent and nonviolent felony convictions); FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(b)-(d)
(West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.) (defining for purposes of sentence enhancement
the terms “habitual violent felony offender,” “three-time violent felony offender,” and “violent
career criminal”); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act 562) (two
convictions for “serious violent felony”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) (West, Westlaw
through the 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (three convictions for “felonies defined as a crime
of violence” or certain sexual offenses; (4)(c) provides another enhancement in cases of four
felony convictions with one counting as a “crime of violence”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 14-101(d) (two convictions for “crime of violence”; subsections (b) and (c) establish more
severe enhancements for additional convictions); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1095(2) (West,
Westlaw through June 18, 2018 Reg. Sess.) (current conviction for “violent crime that is a
felony” combined with two prior convictions for “violent crimes”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1823(A) (West, Westlaw through May 16, 2018 2d Reg. Sess.) (three violent felony convictions);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.04(1)(a) (two convictions for “violent felony”); § 70.08(1)(a) (current
conviction for “violent felony” combined with two prior convictions for “violent felony” or a
designated sexual offense); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-7.7(a) (West, Westlaw through the
end of the 2017 Reg. Sess.) (two convictions for “violent felonies”); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9714(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Acts 1–27, 31) (two
convictions for “crime of violence”; further enhancement under (a)(2) for third conviction);
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may call to mind the image of a hardened criminal who has been cycling in
and out of prison for many years, it should be appreciated that several of these
statutes require only two convictions,129 few require more than three, and
there is typically no limit on the age of the convictions that qualify. 130
Additionally, several of the statutes specify that the most recent conviction
need not itself be for a violent crime, but might be for any felony.131
Moreover, in at least one state, a juvenile adjudication can count,132 and in at
least one other all of the triggering convictions may come in a single
multicount case.133
In addition to such recidivism laws, states have adopted a multitude of
additional violence-specific sentence enhancement statutes. For instance,
two states increase penalties if a violent offense is committed in the presence
of a child,134 while another two do so if the violent offense is committed in a
school zone.135 Four states increase penalties if the victim of a violent offense
is elderly.136 Another does so if the violent offense was committed with an

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120(a) (West, Westlaw through May 21, 2018 2d Reg. Sess.)
(either two or three convictions for “violent offense,” depending on the severity of the
offenses); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through Act 467 of 2018 Gen.
Sess.) (three convictions for “violent felony”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (West, Westlaw
through end of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (three convictions for “act of violence”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 11a(a) (three convictions for violent felonies); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.619(2) (2016)
(two convictions for “serious violent crime”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-201(a) (West,
Westlaw through all chapters effective May 1, 2018 Budget Session) (current conviction for
“violent felony” with two prior felony convictions); cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-805(A)
(requiring sentencing commission to adopt higher sentencing guidelines ranges for certain
defendants with prior violent felony convictions). Other statutes are cited in the next five
footnotes.
129
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501(c)(1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c); FLA. STAT.
§ 775.084(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.).
130
For examples of exceptions, see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-606.6(2) (West,
Westlaw through Act 23 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.04(1)(b)(iv) (McKinney
through L.2019, chs. 1–19)).
131
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (West, Westlaw
through 2018 Reg. Sess. laws effective through June 29, 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17.
132
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (d)(3).
133
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(B).
134
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-703 (West, Westlaw through laws effective June 14, 2018 in
the 2018 Fiscal Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-601.1
(West, Westlaw through legislation effective June 1, 2018 Reg. Sess.).
135
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2(D)(2) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st
Extraordinary Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.632 (2016).
136
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:50.2; MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-351; WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 973.017(5)(b) (2016); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-10a (West, Westlaw through legislation of 2018
Reg. Sess.).
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intent to affect the conduct of government or has a similar “terrorism”
motive.137
In many more states, violent crime sentences are increased if the
defendant used, or sometimes was even just in possession of, a firearm at the
time of the offense.138 Similarly, several states have enhancements if the
defendant was wearing body armor during the commission of a violent
crime.139 A few additional miscellaneous enhancements have also been
adopted.140

137

18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2717(a) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
Sess. Acts 1–27, 31).
138
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-406 (7)(a) (2015) (“[T]he judge shall impose an
additional sentence to the department of corrections of five years for the use of such
weapon.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893.3 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st
Extraordinary Sess.) (ten-year minimum, or twenty if firearm was discharged during
commission of violent felony); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:95(B)(2) (“Whoever commits the crime
of illegal carrying of weapons with any firearm used in the commission of a crime of
violence . . . shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars, or imprisoned . . . for not less
than one year nor more than two years, or both.”); § 14:95(F) (establishing ten-year minimum
for discharging firearm in connection with violent crime; also mandating additional penalties
for use of machine gun or silencer, and for second and subsequent conviction); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-204(b)-(c) (five-year minimum); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(10)
(McKinney through L.2019, chs. 1–19)) (indicating that committing a violent felony while
possessing an unloaded firearm constitutes the separate crime of “criminal possession of a
weapon in the third degree”; aggravated forms of the offense are recognized in §§ 265.08 and
265.09(1)); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9712(a) (five-year minimum); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-1304 (West, Westlaw through May 21, 2018 2d Reg. Sess.) (criminalizing
possession of firearm during violent crime); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.123 (imposing mandatory
minimum if person with prior violent felony uses firearm in commission of violent felony). In
some states, additional penalties are imposed if unusually dangerous firearms were used. MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-306(b) (assault pistol or high-capacity magazine); § 4-404
(machine gun); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-303 (West, Westlaw through the 2017 Sess.)
(machine gun); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-300 (West, Westlaw through end of 2018 Reg. Sess.)
(sawed off shotgun); § 18.2-289 (machine gun). At least one state has also established a
sentence enhancement for the use of a conducted energy device used (Taser) in the
commission of a violent misdemeanor. IDAHO CODE § 18-3325 (West, Westlaw through all
immediately effective legislation of the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 64th Legislature).
139
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-79-101 (West, Westlaw through laws effective June 14, 2018
in the 2018 Fiscal Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.2 (West,
Westlaw through ch. 13 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-106; N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 270.20; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14(B)(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through File
66 of the 132d G.A. (2017–18)); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-287.2.
140
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 423.1 (recognizing offense of committing crime of violence
to interfere with abortion or abortion protesters); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-302(c)(2)
(enhancing sentence for obstruction of justice if underlying crime is violent); TRANSP. § 21904(e)(2) (criminalizing driver’s failure to obey police officer while officer “is signaling for
the driver to stop for the purpose of apprehending the driver for the commission of a crime of
violence for which the driver is subsequently convicted”).
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Other Effects on the Sentence

In addition to sentence enhancements and exclusions from alternatives
to incarceration, violent offenders may find themselves subject to a variety
of additional sentencing CVCs. For instance, in two states, violent offenders
who are convicted of multiple counts are more likely to receive consecutive
sentences.141 In Delaware, defendants who are convicted of a violent felony
are subject to a longer potential term of probation.142 In Louisiana, a safety
valve that in some circumstances permits sentences below an otherwiseapplicable mandatory minimum excludes crimes of violence.143 Many other
examples are available.144
141

See IND. CODE § 35-50-1-2 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. 9.94A.589(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg.
Sess.).
142
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4333(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018,.chs.
200–262). Similarly, a Vermont statute caps the length of probation terms only for nonviolent
felonies. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 205(3)(A) (West, Westlaw through Acts of the Adjourned
Session effective May 25, 2018).
143
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 890.1(D) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st
Extraordinary Sess.).
144
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a) (2015) (requiring, for person convicted of
violent crime, a term of incarceration “of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range”); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-6.1(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act 562) (establishing two types of
mandatory minimums for offenses categorized as “serious violent felony”); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 704-411 (West, Westlaw through Act 23 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (specifying that
defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity should be given the least restrictive
commitment possible if the charge was nonviolent); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.10(5a)(a)(8)
(West, Westlaw through June 18, 2018 Reg. Sess.) (recognizing as ground to impose sentence
above guidelines range that defendant has three violent crime convictions); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-255(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2017 Sess.) (requiring judge, when sentencing
violent offender to probation, to impose “reasonable employment or occupational prohibitions
and restrictions designed to protect the class or classes of persons containing the likely victims
of further offenses by the defendant”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02(3) (McKinney through
L.2019, chs. 1–19)) (establishing various minimum terms for violent felonies, depending on
the class of the felony); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1353 (West, Westlaw through the end
of the 2017 Reg. Sess.) (permitting pregnant defendant to defer sentence starting date only if
she has been convicted of nonviolent crime); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.28(B) (requiring
that sentence for certain violent offenses include period of “post-release control”); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-35-122(a) (West, Westlaw through May 21, 2018 2d Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting
sentences of continuous confinement, but only for offenses classified as “non-violent
property” offenses§ 9.94A.505(7) (denying sentencing credits to violent offenders for time
spent on electronic monitoring prior to sentencing); § 9.94A.650(1)(a); (excluding violent
offenders from “first-time offender waiver,” which permits judge to sentence below standard
sentencing range); ); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.701(1)-(2) (requiring for violent
offenders lengthier periods of post-incarceration supervision); Additionally, in a few states,
violent offenders are categorically excluded from release pending sentencing or appeal. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-122(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through laws effective June 14, 2018 in
the 2018 Fiscal Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-201.5(1)(d); cf.
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C. CORRECTIONS-RELATED CVCS

1.

Release from Prison

In general, a judge’s decision to sentence a defendant to a particular
term in jail or prison sets parameters on the defendant’s length of stay, but
does not dictate the precise release date.145 Indeed, depending on the offense,
the offender, and the jurisdiction, there can be considerable variation in the
percentage of the incarceration term that is actually served. Release dates are
a function of parole laws and practices, “good time” credits for good behavior
behind bars, and the availability of other early release opportunities. Given
what we have already seen of CVCs, it should not be surprising that the rules
governing release dates tend to be different and more restrictive for inmates
who have been convicted of an offense categorized as “violent.”146 Indeed,
in combination with the sentencing CVCs, the prison-release consequences
deliver a sort of “double-whammy”—violent offenders get longer prison
terms, and then have to serve a higher percentage of their prison terms before
release.
Consider parole. In the thirty-three states with discretionary parole, a
parole board makes the decision about when prisoners will return to the
community.147 Typically, inmates become eligible for parole after serving a
certain percentage of their terms; the rules vary by state, but one-quarter is a
common figure.148 However, violent offenders often face special restrictions,
which can take a number of different forms. Most notably, several states
delay or even eliminate parole eligibility on the basis of violent crime
convictions. For instance, in Arkansas, a defendant sentenced for a “serious
violent felony” or a “felony involving violence” may be considered for parole
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-319 (West, Westlaw through end of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (establishing
rebuttable presumption against release if conviction for violent felony and nonsuspendable
incarceration sentence imposed).
145
See O’HEAR, supra note 22, at 107–09 (2018) (describing common mechanisms of
early release).
146
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-45(b)(3)(A)(i), (b)(4)(A)(i) (excluding certain
inmates from parole if they have ever been convicted of “serious violent felony”); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 47-7-3(1)(g)(i) (excluding inmates from parole if convicted of violent crime).
147
O’HEAR, supra note 22, at 67–68.
148
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-301(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3(g)(i) (West, Westlaw
through 2018 Reg. Sess.). Rather than setting parole eligibility as a certain percentage of the
judge-imposed prison term, some states instead use a system in which the judge sentences
defendants to a range, for example, five to ten years in prison. Joan Petersilia, Parole and
Prisoner Re-Entry, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 925, 928
(Michael Tonry ed., 2011). The defendant then becomes eligible for parole when the lower
end of the range is reached, for example, at the five-year mark if the sentence is five to ten.
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only after reaching the age of fifty-five,149 while a defendant convicted twice
of a violent felony is simply declared ineligible for parole.150 Meanwhile, in
Connecticut, parole eligibility for violent offenders is deferred until they
have served 85% of their sentences.151 This percentage-based approach has
also been adopted in several other states.152
In Maryland, an inmate may generally be released on parole at any time
for treatment purposes, but not if the inmate has been convicted of a violent
crime.153 Instead, violent offenders in Maryland must serve at least one-half
of their prison terms before becoming eligible for parole consideration.154
Similarly, in West Virginia, inmates may benefit from an accelerated parole
program, but only if they do not have a current or past conviction for a violent
felony.155
Violent offenders may also face special procedural rules. For instance,
in Louisiana and Maryland, nonviolent offenders can obtain parole
automatically without a hearing (“administrative parole”) by satisfying
certain conditions, but this streamlined process is not available to inmates
who have been convicted of a violent crime.156
149

ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-615(h).
Id. at § 16-93-609(b). For other statutes excluding violent offenders from parole in
certain circumstances, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.085 (West, Westlaw through Ch.
94 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting parole for inmates who committed violent felony while
out on parole); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-45(b)(3)(A)(i), (b)(4)(A)(i) (excluding certain inmates
from parole if they have ever been convicted of “serious violent felony”); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 47-7-3(1)(g)(i) (excluding inmates convicted of violent crime).
151
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a(c) (West, Westlaw through Public Acts effective
July 1, 2018).
152
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-403(3.5)(a) (2015) (75%); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-945(f) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.) (seven years or one-third of prison term,
whichever comes first); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.3401(3) (West, Westlaw through laws
effective July 14, 2018) (eighty-five percent); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(B)(1) (West,
Westlaw through the 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (65%); § 15:574.4(A)(1)(b)(i) (75% if one
prior violent-crime conviction; no eligibility at all after subsequent convictions).
153
MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-301(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added).
154
Id. at § 7-301(c)(1)(i). Other inmates generally become eligible for parole after serving
one-quarter of their prison terms. § 7-301(a)(2).
155
W. VA. CODE § 62-12-13(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (West, Westlaw through legislation of 2018
st
1 Extraordinary Sess.). Similarly, Missouri excludes inmates with a prior violent felony from
a special parole opportunity for inmates convicted of killing an abusive spouse or domestic
partner. MO. ANN. STAT. § 217.692(2) (West, Westlaw through emergency legislation
approved June 1, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.).
156
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.2(C)(4)(a); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7301.1(a)(3)(iii)(1). For other examples of special procedural rules, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 1722.5-403(5)(b) (2015) (“[T]he board need only reconsider granting parole to [certain violent
offenders] once every five years . . . .”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 574.2(3) (requiring meeting “at
150
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Parole is not the only pathway to release from prison. Another common
mechanism is “good time.” Found in twenty-nine states,157 good time
provides inmates with credits toward early release based on their success in
avoiding serious disciplinary infractions. Good time is available in some of
the states that have eliminated discretionary parole, but can also be integrated
into a parole system.158 Structured similarly to good time, “earned time” has
also been adopted by several states and provides credits based on an inmate’s
participation in work, rehabilitative programming, and the like.159 However,
as with parole, violent offenders often confront special restrictions on their
ability to benefit from good time and earned time. For instance, Kentucky
simply excludes violent offenders from good time.160 Louisiana similarly
excludes inmates on a second conviction for a violent crime,161 and awards
good time at a reduced rate on the first.162 Similar restrictions are also
common with earned time programs.163
which at least five of the seven members of the committee are present and all members present
vote to grant parole” for release of inmate convicted of violent crime against peace officer);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201(5) (West, Westlaw through the 2017 Sess.) (authorizing sixyear delay before next hearing after denial of parole to violent offender; general rule is no
more than one year); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 806(1)(i) (McKinney through L. 2018, Chs. 1 to
112) (excluding from presumptive release opportunity inmates convicted of violent felony).
157
Michael O’Hear, Solving the Good-Time Puzzle: Why Following the Rules Should Get
You Out of Prison Early, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 195, 197.
158
See James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV.
217, 222-24 (1982) (describing ways that good time can be integrated into parole system).
159
Id. n.10. What I call “earned time” here goes by different names in some states, such
as “meritorious time.” Programs in some states blend aspects of good time and earned time,
basing credits on a combination of good behavior and program participation. See, e.g., Michael
O’Hear, Good Conduct Time for Prisoners: Why (and How) Wisconsin Should Provide
Credits Toward Early Release, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 487, 536–37 (2014) (describing Washington
program).
160
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.3401(4) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 14,
2018).
161
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.3(D)(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
162
The standard rate in Louisiana is thirteen days for every seven days in actual custody,
§ 15:571.3(B)(1)(a), but the amount for first-time violent offenders is only one day for every
three, § 15:571.3(B)(2)(a). Maryland also awards good time to violent offenders at a reduced
rate. MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-704(b) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective
July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.).
163
COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-405(5)(a) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-6.1(c)(4)
(West, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-6-2(c-1) (West,
Westlaw through P.A. 100-601 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.047(6)(b);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:828(C)(2); § 15:833.1(D)-(E); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3707(a)(2)(i); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-431 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); § 47-5138(5) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-2-34(A)(1)-(2)
(West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 803(1)(d)(ii) (McKinney
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While parole, good time, and earned time are the most widely utilized
mechanisms for early release, states have developed a number of other
devices, which also tend to operate differently for violent offenders. For
instance, some states have compassionate release programs that grant early
release to inmates who are disabled, terminally ill, or simply very old and
unlikely to harm anyone. Violent offenders, however, can be subject to
exclusion or special restrictions.164 Similarly, some states permit inmates to
be released early to a halfway house, but restrict such placements for violent
offenders.165 Additionally, some states authorize corrections officials to
move inmates from prisons into home detention and/or electronic monitoring
in the community, but exclude violent offenders or impose special limitations
on their eligibility.166 Violent offenders may also be precluded from transfer
from prison into drug treatment or other rehabilitative programs,167 or into
other special supervision programs in the community.168 Numerous other
illustrations are available.169
through L. 2019, chs. 1–19112); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-230(B) (West, Westlaw through
2018 Act No. 218); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.101(b), (d) (West, Westlaw through
the 2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sessions of the 85th Legis.); § 9.92.151(1). Similarly, Arizona
denies earned release to inmates who were convicted of a violent crime that was committed
under the influence of a narcotic drug; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(3) (West, Westlaw
through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.).. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.15
(West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Special Sess., and legislation effective May 16, 2018 of
the 2d Reg. Sess.).
164
COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-1-102(7.5)(b)(II) (excluding certain violent offenders from
definition of “special needs offender”; provisions governing early parole for “special needs
offender” are set forth in § 17-22.5-403.5); LA. STAT. ANN. § 574.4(A)(4)(a) (excluding
violent offenders from age-based parole); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3(1)(g)(ii) (same).
165
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-102 (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.265a(8) (West,
Westlaw through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-155.1
(West, Westlaw through end of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
166
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-711 (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1, 2018
in the 2018 Fiscal Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3404(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-131.2(C).
167
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-681(b) (West, Westlaw through Public Acts
effective July 1, 2018); IND. CODE § 11-13-9-1(1)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.62(B)(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
168
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.2(B)(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-720 (West, Westlaw
through 2018 Act No. 218); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.6551 (West, Westlaw through all
effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
169
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-28-604 (no emergency overcrowding release for
violent offenders); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:764(B) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.0513 Subd.
2(6) (West, Westlaw through July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.) (no release based on completion of
drug treatment). Additionally, in other states, noncitizens who are violent offenders may miss
out on the possibility of early release to deportation; they must serve out their entire sentence
before the inevitable return to their countries of origin. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:25
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Community Supervision

Corrections-related CVCs are not limited to release opportunities, but
also extend to the period of post-release supervision, when individuals who
have been convicted of violent crimes are apt to encounter rules that are less
favorable in a number of respects. For instance, in a manner that is analogous
to the operation of good time credits for prisoners, some states provide for
early discharge from supervision for offenders who manage to avoid
significant disciplinary problems.170 However, violent offenders are often
excluded from this opportunity or subjected to special restrictions.171
Individuals on supervision reside in the community subject to a variety
of conditions, as determined by the jurisdiction’s laws and the discretionary
decisions of judges and supervisory agents. Violations of these conditions
can lead to a revocation of supervision and a term of incarceration. Once
again, though, the rules governing responses to violations may be quite
different for violent than other offenders, particularly with respect to their
eligibility for alternatives to revocation.172 Additionally, in the event of
revocation, violent offenders may face longer terms of reincarceration.173
VII(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 334 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 259i(d)(i) (McKinney through L. 2019, chs. 1–19); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-64.1(a)(2) (West,
Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.685 (West,
Westlaw through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
170
Edward E. Rhine, Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, The Future of Parole Release, 46
CRIME & JUST. 279, 326 (2017).
171
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1302(a)(1)(B); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3001(a) (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 94 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(D)
(2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.6.1(A); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 6-117(a)(4)(ii),
(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); N.Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 205(1)(a) (McKinney through L. 2018, Chs. 1 to 112); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 895.6(A) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.637(4).
172
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3063.1(a)(b)(1) (prohibiting revocation of parole for certain
drug-related violations, but excluding parolees with violent felony conviction from this
protection); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 899.2(A) (authorizing administrative sanctions
for probation violations, but excluding violent offenders); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.14 subd.
2a(a)(1) (requiring probation agent to present court with local options to address violations by
a defendant who is a “nonviolent controlled substance offender”); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. 9771.1(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 27 and 31)
(disqualifying violent offenders from alternative program for violations). Additionally, in at
least two states, there are special restrictions on bail release for violent offenders awaiting a
hearing on an alleged violation. See FLA. STAT. § 903.0351(1)(a), (c) (West, Westlaw through
2018 2d Reg. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 301(4) (West, Westlaw through Acts of the
Adjourned Session of the Vt. G.A. effective through June 1, 2018).
173
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.9(H)(1) (parallel provisions for parole revocation); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 900(A)(5) (specifying that, when revoking a violent offender’s
probation, court has discretion over whether to award sentence credit for time served on
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Moreover, violations that themselves qualify as “crimes of violence” may
also trigger CVCs.174
The required length of time on supervision175 and the intensity of
supervision176 may also be categorically different for violent offenders. Such
differences matter, not only because of the intrusiveness and inconvenience
of supervision, but also because longer and closer supervision increases the
likelihood of detection and sanctioning of technical violations, including
through revocation.177 Violent offenders returning from prison may also be
denied access to helpful transitional opportunities and services.178
3.

Other Corrections CVCs

Additional statutes establish many other sorts of restrictions and
requirements relating to the correctional management of violent offenders.
For instance, they are excluded in California from an alternative custody

probation; for other defendants; court must award credit); art. 900(A)(6)(b) (capping term of
incarceration following probation revocation, but recognizing exception for defendant
convicted of violent crime); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-401(d)(3) (denying violent
offenders credit for time on parole before revocation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651A:19(III)(c) (authorizing “extended term of recommittal for greater than 90 days” if defendant
on parole for violent crime).
174
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3069(c)(2) (excluding parolee from Parole Violation
Intermediate Sanctions program if violation is violent felony); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-2103.5(1)(a)(II)(B) (requiring officer to initiate revocation of parolee arrested and charged with
violent crime); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.236 (West, Westlaw through all effective
legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (requiring revocation if violent felony committed while on
parole).
175
See IND. CODE § 35-50-6-1 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
176
See FLA. STAT. § 948.12(2) (requiring intensive parole supervision for “violent
habitual offender” or “violent career criminal”); IND. CODE § 35-38-2.5-12 (setting forth
special supervision requirements for violent offenders on home detention); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 791.240(1) (setting forth “special provisions” for supervision of parolee serving
sentence for violent felony).
177
See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1062 (2013) (“[L]engthy periods of supervision serve little purpose
other than to provide almost unlimited opportunity for violations and revocation.”).
178
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-281(B)(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st
Special Sess., and legislation effective May 16, 2018 of the 2d Reg. Sess.) (transition
program); § 41-1604.18(A)(1)(b) (reentry community work program); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 6243(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 94 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (substance abuse community
correctional detention centers); § 6263 (reentry work furlough program); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.100 (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 14, 2018) (opportunity to serve last five
years of prison term in jail); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1199.7(C)(2) (West, Westlaw through the
2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (rehabilitation and workforce development program); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-13-125 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act No. 218) (work release).
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program for female offenders.179 Similarly, Colorado excludes defendants
convicted of a violent felony from placement in a minimum security facility
until they have served at least six months in a more restrictive setting. 180
Likewise, Indiana imposes special restrictions on inmates convicted of
violent crimes who are placed in a minimum security release program. 181
Other statutes similar in spirit to these are found in many other states.182
D. CVCS SPECIFIC TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS

In addition to all of the CVCs we have considered thus far that apply
more generally, many states also have consequences that are specific to
juveniles who are accused of, or have been adjudicated delinquent for, a
violent offense.
For instance, whether a juvenile is charged with an offense that is
classified as “violent” may determine whether he or she is prosecuted in the
juvenile or the adult system.183 The venue of prosecution, in turn, may have
profound consequences as to the nature and severity of the punishment, and
ultimately the juvenile’s long-term life prospects.184 Yet, in some states,

179

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.05.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-25-103.
181
IND. CODE § 11-10-8-2(2)(b)(1).
182
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 574.4.4(A) (limiting special intensive parole option to
nonviolent offenders); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2225(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2017
Sess.) (allowing some nonviolent offenders sentenced to county jail to serve their sentences
by performing work for the county “without actual physical confinement”); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-3-210(D) (establishing special procedural requirements before prison furlough may be
granted to violent offender); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 13.016(e) (West, Westlaw
through the 2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sessions of the 85th Legis.) (permitting some nonviolent
offenders to serve their sentences through work in state parks or on other public lands); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 808(f) (West, Westlaw through Acts of the Adjourned Session of the Vt.
G.A. effective through June 1, 2018) (“[T]he Department shall not use lack of housing as the
sole factor in denying furlough to offenders who have served at least their minimum sentence
for a nonviolent misdemeanor or nonviolent felony . . . .” (emphasis added)); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.680(2) (West, Westlaw through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.)
(“[F]or offenders convicted of nonviolent offenses only, eight hours of community restitution
may be substituted for one day of total confinement . . . .”); § 72.66.016(2) (deferring furlough
eligibility for violent offenders until half of minimum term served); W. VA. CODE § 31-2031(a) (West, Westlaw through legislation of 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (requiring creation
of jobs programs for certain jail inmates, but excluding those convicted of violent felony).
183
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 722.23(1)(a) (McKinney through L. 2019, chs. 1–
19) (establishing process for removal of felony cases against certain adolescent defendants to
family court, but excluding cases in which violent felony charged); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1241(A) (West, Westlaw through end of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (limiting jurisdiction of juvenile court
in cases in which juvenile alleged to have committed violent felony).
184
One scholar summarizes the research this way:
180

210

O'HEAR

[Vol. 109

violence charges automatically result in a transfer to adult court. Thus, in
Arizona, prosecutors must charge as an adult those juveniles over the age of
fourteen who are accused of committing a violent felony, 185 while a similar
rule exists in Florida for juveniles over the age of fifteen who face a charge
for a second violent crime.186 In other states, a violence charge opens the
door to a potential transfer, depending on the discretionary decisions of a
judge and/or prosecutor. For instance, in Colorado, the juvenile court may
enter an order certifying a twelve- or thirteen-year old to be held for adult
proceedings if the juvenile is alleged to have committed a crime of
violence,187 while in Wyoming prosecutors are authorized to choose a
juvenile or adult court in cases in which a juvenile aged fourteen or older is
charged with a violent felony.188
Criminal court judges sentence transferred youths like adults, which increases their
likelihood of subsequent offending. While all inmates potentially face abuse,
adoloscents’ size, physical strength, lesser social skills, and lack of sophistication
increase their risk for physical, sexual, and psychological victimization. . . . Prisons are
developmentally inappropriate places for youths to form an identity, acquire social
skills, or make a successful transition to adulthood. Imprisoning them exacts different
and greater developmental opportunity costs than those experiences by adults. It
disrupts normal development—completing education, finding a job, forming
relationships, and creating social bonds that promote desistance [from crime]—and
ground lost may never be regained.
Feld, supra note 89, at 378. See also Megan Bears Augustyn & Thomas A Loughran, Juvenile
Waiver as a Mechanism of Social Stratification: A Focus on Human Capital, 55 CRIMINOLOGY
405, 425–26 (2017) (finding large earnings differences seven years after sanctioning between
matched samples of juveniles who were prosecuted in adult versus juvenile court).
185
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501(A)(5) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Special
Sess., and legislation effective May 16, 2018 of the 2d Reg. Sess.).
186
FLA. STAT. § 985.557(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.). For younger
juveniles facing a second charge, prosecution in adult court is favored, but not mandatory. See
§ 985.556(3)(a). For additional statutes mandating prosecution in adult court, see N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 722.23(1)(a) (McKinney through L. 2019, chs. 1–19) (establishing process for
removal of felony cases against certain adolescent defendants to family court, but excluding
cases in which violent felony charged); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (West, Westlaw through
end of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (limiting jurisdiction of juvenile court in cases in which juvenile
alleged to have committed violent felony); W. VA. CODE § 49-4-710(d) (requiring transfer
from juvenile court if probable cause that juvenile at least fourteen, committed violent felony,
and has previously been adjudged delinquent for commission of violent felony).
187
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518(1)(a)(I)(A) (2015). For another statute giving the
juvenile court discretion to transfer certain violent crime cases, see W. VA. CODE § 49-4710(g)(1).
188
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-203(f)(iv) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Budget Session).
For other statutes similarly giving prosecutors the ability to proceed in adult court in certain
violent crime cases, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b)(21) (West, Westlaw through Ch.
119 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-517(1)(a)(III); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241
(West, Westlaw through end of 2018 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v).
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Other juvenile-specific CVCs parallel the CVCs we have already
considered relating to adult pre-conviction processes, sentencing, and
corrections. For instance, juveniles who face violence charges in the juvenile
system are more likely to be subjected to pretrial detention and more likely
to be held for longer periods of time.189 They may also be excluded from a
range of pretrial diversion opportunities that are open to other juvenile
defendants.190 Similarly, juveniles who have been found delinquent for an
offense classified as violent may miss out on post-adjudication alternatives
to confinement.191 They may also be subject to various analogs to the adult
sentence enhancements considered above,192 and to harsher dispositions in a
variety of other ways.193
189
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-508(3)(a)(III)(A) (establishing presumption in favor of
detention if juvenile alleged to have committed violent felony); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11504(c) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.) (permitting juvenile detained for
commission of “serious violent felony” to be held in adult facility for up to 24 hours in certain
circumstances); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-410(2)(c) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-601
of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“[N]o minor shall be detained in a county jail or municipal lockup for
more than 12 hours, unless the offense is a crime of violence in which case the minor may be
detained up to 24 hours.”); LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art. 877(A) (West, Westlaw through 2018
1st Extraordinary Sess.) (permitting longer period of detention prior to adjudication hearing if
juvenile charged with violent crime).
190
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51220.2(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 119 of 2018 Reg.
Sess.) (“teen court” and “peer court”); FLA. STAT. § 985.16(2)(d) (limiting community
arbitration program such that juveniles with prior first-degree violent misdemeanor are more
likely to be excluded); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 410/20(b) (drug court); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 52.031(a)(3)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sess.) (first offender
program); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260(B) (informal case processing); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.40.127(1) (West, Westlaw through all effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (deferred
disposition); W. VA. CODE § 49-4-702(c) (informal resolution); § 49-4-725(a) (West, Westlaw
through legislation of 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (restorative justice).. Additionally, as with
violent adult offenders, violent juveniles may face distinct rules in cases of incompetency.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1007A(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018, chs. 200–71).
191
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-908(1)(c)(I)(A) (2015) (“Upon adjudication as a violent
juvenile offender, . . . the juvenile shall be placed or committed out of the home for not less
than one year.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.8.(A)(7a)(ii) (excluding violent juvenile
offenders from probationary sentencing option with treatment).
192
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602.3(a) (requiring commitment of “any minor
adjudicated to be a ward of the court for the personal use of a firearm in the commission of a
violent felony”); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-820(f) (requiring commitment until age twentyone of certain repeat violent juvenile offenders); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.8(B)(4) (West,
Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (requiring prison term of at least six months
for any juvenile adjudicated delinquent for unlawful possession of a handgun “having been
previously found guilty or adjudicated delinquent for any crime of violence”).
193
See ALA. CODE § 12-15-133(h) (West, Westlaw through Act 2018-579) (permitting
record of adjudication for violent offense to be used against juvenile in subsequent cases);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518(1)(d)(I), (III) (requiring that juvenile convicted of violent crime
be sentenced under adult sentencing law); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-6-3(b)(7)(v) (authorizing
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E. CONSEQUENCES OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE SYSTEM

The legal consequences of a conviction may continue past completion
of the sentence and involve various disabilities that are not formally included
in the sentence and may not even be known by the judge at the time of
sentencing.194 While any conviction may give rise to such “collateral”
consequences, those associated with violent offenses tend to be especially
numerous and severe.
1.

Employment-Related CVCs

Consider first the employment-related disabilities. Among the most
common and practically significant are restrictions on working with children,
the elderly, and the disabled.195 These CVCs are premised on a view that
court to require certain juveniles convicted of violent crime to switch schools); LA. CHILD
CODE ANN. art. 898(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (capping
length of commitment period for nonviolent felony adjudications); art. 898(C)(1) (same as to
period of probation); MO. ANN. STAT. § 219.091(5) (West, Westlaw through emergency
legislation approved June 1, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (excluding violent juvenile offenders from
community work program); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:4(V)(a) (permitting juvenile court
under certain circumstances to retain jurisdiction beyond normal period over juvenile “found
to have committed a violent crime”); § 169-B:31-c(I) (“[T]he court shall close all cases other
than those involving serious violent offenses no later than 2 years after the date of
adjudication.”); § 621:19(I-a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 334 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.)
(generally capping commitment terms at six months, but making exception for juveniles found
delinquent for “serious violent offense”); § 621:19(IV) (requiring quarterly review of case of
each committed juvenile to determine if juvenile can be safely moved from facility, but
making exception if juvenile is “serious violent offender”); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272(A)(1)
(authorizing court, if juvenile convicted of “violent juvenile felony,” to require that some or
all of sentence be served “in the same manner as provided for adults”); § 16.1-278.8(A)(4a)(ii)
(excluding violent juvenile offenders from boot camp sentence); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.40.160(3) (excluding certain violent juvenile offenders from “special sex offender
disposition alternative”); § 13.40.210(2) (excluding violent juvenile offenders from early
release based on institutional overcrowding); W. VA. CODE § 49-4-714(b)(6) (prohibiting outof-home placements for certain juveniles adjudicated delinquent for nonviolent
misdemeanor); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.535 (2016) (excluding violent juvenile offenders from
early release into intensive supervision); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-246(a)(iv) (West, Westlaw
through the 2018 Budget Sess.) (assigning higher “sanction level” to juveniles adjudicated
delinquent for violent felony).
194
See O’HEAR, supra note 22, at 45-46 (2018) (providing illustrations of collateral
consequences and noting that “some consequences in some states may last for years after the
sentence is over—potentially, indeed, for the rest of the offender’s life”).
195
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-594(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st Special
Sess., and legislation effective May 16, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (authorizing denial, suspension,
or revocation of license for home for developmentally disabled if “employee, applicant,
licensee or adult household member” has been convicted of “violence related offense”); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-38-105(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1, 2018, Fiscal
Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.) (authorizing permanent disqualification from employment
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with child care facility based on violent offense); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44237(e)(1) (“[A private
school] shall not employ a person who has been convicted of a violent or serious felony . . . .”);
§ 44830.1(a) (“[N]o person who has been convicted of a violent or serious felony shall be
hired by a school district in a position requiring certification qualifications or supervising
positions requiring certification qualifications.”); § 45125.1(f)(2) (establishing bypass process
around general prohibition on school contractors having employees with felony convictions
who come into contact with pupils, but excluding employees with violent convictions); CAL.
VEH. CODE § 13370(a)(5) (mandating denial or revocation of “[s]choolbus, school pupil
activity bus, general public paratransit vehicle, or youth bus driver certificate, or a certificate
for a vehicle used for the transportation of developmentally disabled persons” based on violent
felony conviction); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11324(c)(1) (requiring denial of payment for
certain child care services if provider has violent felony conviction); COLO. REV. STAT. § 266-120(2)(b) (prohibiting contract under child care assistance program if provider has violent
crime conviction); § 22-32-109.8(6.5)(a)(I)(B) (disqualifying from school district
employment individuals convicted of violent crime); § 22-60.5-107(2.5)(a)(I)(B) (mandating
denial or loss of educator license based on violent crime conviction); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 1218(b)(1)(b) (mandating revocation of education license based on violent felony
conviction); tit. 31, § 309(d)(1)(c) (prohibiting individual from serving as employee,
volunteer, or contractor for a child-serving entity if individual has had violent felony
conviction in past seven years for the amount of time indicated); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.165(6) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 14, 2018) (“No employee in a position
which involves care and supervision of a minor as a child-serving professional . . . shall have
been convicted of a violent crime . . . .”); § 164.281(3) (authorizing public institutions of
postsecondary education to deny employment and even visiting privileges to anyone convicted
of violent offense); § 216B.457(12)(a) (“Any employee or volunteer who has committed or is
charged with the commission of a violent offense . . . shall be immediately removed from
contact with a child within the residential treatment center until the employee or volunteer is
cleared of the charge.”); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 2-206.1(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting nonpublic schools from hiring or
retaining “employee who works with or has access to students” if employee has violent crime
conviction); § 6-113(a)(3) (prohibiting employment by county education board of individual
with violent crime conviction); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 171.3215(4) (West, Westlaw through
laws effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.) (permitting those convicted of nonviolent felony to
obtain waiver of general prohibition on individuals with felony conviction from holding
school bus driver license); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-E:7(III) (generally requiring
revocation, denial, or suspension of license for child day care providers based on violent crime
conviction); § 170-E:29(III) (requiring corrective action plan for foster family home,
institution or child-placing agency if staff member has violent crime conviction); N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW § 390-b.3(a)(i) (McKinney through L. 2019, chs. 1–19) (generally requiring denial
of application to operate day care center if any adult resident has violent crime conviction);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 589A (West, Westlaw through legislation effective July 1, 2018,
2d Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting individuals registered as violent offenders from working with
children or on school premises); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-264(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through
2018 Act 226) (“A nursing home license or community residential care facility license must
not be issued to the applicant, and if issued, may be revoked, if the [operator] . . . has been
convicted of: . . . (b) any violent crime . . . .”); § 59-25-280(A) (mandating denial or
revocation of teaching certificate based on violent crime conviction); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 13-10-13 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Session Laws) (prohibiting employment by school
district if person has violent crime conviction); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-2-403(e) (West,
Westlaw through laws effective June 30, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (disqualifying from adult day
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committing a violent act, regardless of the victim or circumstances, shows
that the perpetrator, in the words of a New Hampshire statute, “might be
reasonably expected to pose a threat to a child”196 or to another similarly
vulnerable person. The statutes generally make no distinctions based on the
age of the conviction, and few provide any flexibility in the handling of past
conduct that was plainly aberrational or otherwise clearly a poor predictor of
future conduct.197
Individuals with violence convictions may find themselves excluded
from many other fields of work, too. For instance, several CVC statutes
relate to work in security or investigations,198 while others prohibit violent
offenders from driving as part of a transportation network (i.e., Uber and its

care center employment individual with violent offense conviction, adjudication, or pending
charge); § 71-3-507(e)(1)(A)(i)(b) (prohibiting childcare agency employment of person
convicted of violent crime); WASH. REV. CODE § 72.05.440(1) (West, Westlaw through all
effective legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting person with violent crime conviction
from being employed in, or volunteering for, “position within the juvenile rehabilitation
administration or any agency with which it contracts in which the person may have regular
access to juveniles”); W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-21(a)(2) (generally prohibiting employment in
nursing home of person with violent felony conviction).
196
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-E:29(III).
197
For an unusual example of such flexibility, see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 390-b.3(a)(i)
(“[T]he office of children and family services shall deny the application unless the office
determines, in its discretion, that approval of the application will not in any way jeopardize
the health, safety or welfare of the children in the center, program or home . . . .”).
198
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-39-211(10) (polygraph examiner); § 17-39-306(11) (voice
stress examiner); § 17-40-306(d)(1)(B) (precluding license to work as security officer or
investigator if person has been convicted of, inter alia, a violent Class A misdemeanor); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-691(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Public Acts effective July 1, 2018)
(locksmith); LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:3276.1(A)(1) (private security); § 40:1664.8(D)-(E)
(indicating, as to property protection license, that nonviolent felony conviction not “automatic
disqualification”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-69-11(2)(c)(ii)-(iii) (West, Westlaw through 2018
Reg. Sess.) (same as to license for alarm systems work); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 74D-10(a)(4)
(West, Westlaw through the end of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (alarm systems work).
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competitors),199 working as a massage therapist,200 or becoming a driving
school instructor.201 Still other CVCs affect eligibility for employment in
emergency services202 and health care.203
There are many other work-related restrictions that might be noted.204
Some of the more unexpected include those that affect an individual’s ability
to work as
199
See ALA. CODE § 32-7C-29(b)(2); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5445.2(a)(2)(B)(i) (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 119 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-10.1-605(3)(c)(I)(D)
(2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 1913(b)(2)-(3) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018, chs.
200–71); FLA. STAT. § 627.748(11)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.); ME.
STAT. tit. 29-A, § 1675(2)(C) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 317 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. 159A 1/2, § 4(b)(vii) (West, Westlaw through ch. 108 of the 2018 2d Annual
Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-8-25(3)(b); N.M. STAT ANN. § 65-7-12(B) (West, Westlaw
through end of 2018 2d Reg. Sess.); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1699(b)(ii) (McKinney through
L. 2019, chs. 1–19); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4925.04 (West, Westlaw through File 84 of the
132 G.A. (2017-18)); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 57A12(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
Sess. Act 72); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-51-107(2)(b)(vii) (West, Westlaw through the 2018
Gen. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-2099.49(C)(2) (West, Westlaw through end of 2018 Reg.
Sess.); W. VA. CODE § 17-29-13(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through legislation of 2018 1st
Extraordinary Sess.). In a similar spirit, Pennsylvania also prohibits violent offenders from
working as taxi drivers. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 57B02(c)(10).
200
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:3556(A)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary
Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640C.700(3) (West, Westlaw through end of 77th Reg. Sess.
(2017)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-B:8(IV) (West, Westlaw through ch. 334 of the 2018
Reg. Sess.). Similarly, New Hampshire also prohibits violent offenders from working in the
fields of reflexology, structural integration, and Asian bodywork therapy. See § 328-H:8(I)(d).
201
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 90, § 32G(c); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 394(4)(c); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 708(4) (West, Westlaw through Adjourned Sess. acts effective June 1,
2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.82.350(2) (West, Westlaw through all effective legislation of
2018 Reg. Sess.).
202
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6712(b)(2)(b) (ambulance attendants and emergency
medical technicians); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-31-3-14.5 (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg.
Sess. and 1st Special Sess.) (EMS).
203
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1799II(a)(4) (midwife license); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 616-15.1(A) (surgical and medical licenses); § 61-10-15.1(A)(3) (osteopathic medicine license);
§ 61-36-6(B) (lactation care license).
204
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-4701(K)(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through the 2018
1st Special Sess., and legislation effective May 16, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (generally permitting
occupational licensing authorities to grant licenses notwithstanding criminal record, but
making exception for violent crime convictions); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-1-103(b)(2)(C) (West,
Westlaw through laws effective July 1, 2018, Fiscal Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.)
(precluding consideration of misdemeanor convictions in license decisions, except if violent
or sexual); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-90-111(9)(b)(I) (restricting employment by department of
human services); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23.6-10.5-2.5(2)(A) (clinical addiction counselor
associate); LA. STAT. ANN. § 27:28(B)(1)(e) (casino license, permit, or operating contract);
§ 37:36(A) (“A licensing entity shall not be required to issue a provisional license to any
person convicted of any of the following: . . . (2) A ‘crime of violence’ . . . .”);
§ 46:2356(A)(1) (authorizing commission on the deaf to deny, suspend, or revoke interpreter’s
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 a used car or used car parts dealer,205
 a wind certification or hurricane mitigation inspector,206
 an embalmer,207
 a repairer or installer of manufactured homes,208 or
 a precious metals dealer.209
Most of these statutes affect employment directly, usually through
occupational licensing rules.210 Other statutes have an indirect, but still
potentially significant, impact. For instance, a Louisiana statute generally
shields employers from civil liability for hiring an individual who has a
criminal record, but recognizes an exception as to employees who have been
convicted of a violent crime.211 Meanwhile, another Louisiana statute uses a
tax credit to encourage employers to hire first-time offenders, but limits the

license on basis of conviction for “crime of violence”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 1209(b) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting denial
of occupation license solely on conviction, but making exception for violent crime
conviction); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 935.06(A)(6) (permits for wildlife shelter); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 40-57-710(A)(9) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act 226) (real estate license); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-116(C)(ii) (tow truck driver registration).
Work relating to alcohol and controlled substances seems particularly prone to restriction. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2804(B)(2) (mandating that no principal officer or board
member of nonprofit medical marijuana dispensary may have conviction for “excluded felony
offense”; under § 36-2801(7)(a), violent crime is included in definition of “excluded felony
offense”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26057(b)(4)(A) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 1st
Special Sess., and legislation effective May 16, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring marijuana
dispensary licensing authority to consider whether applicant has violent felony conviction);
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/10 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100–607 of 2018 Reg. Sess.)
(“‘Excluded offense’ for cultivation center agents and dispensing organizations means: (1) a
violent crime . . . .”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 26:80(F)(2)(a) (alcohol permits); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 67-1-57(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (managerial positions with alcohol
permittees); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 2-147(B) (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective July 1, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (“mixed beverage, beer and wine, bottle club, public
event or caterer license”).
205
GA. CODE ANN. § 43-47-10(1)(J) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.).
206
MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-1-191(1)(b)(ii)(1)(d).
207
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-19-230(A)(2).
208
Id. at § 40-29-200(F).
209
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3881(3)(B) (West, Westlaw through Adjourned Sess. acts
effective June 1, 2018).
210
See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13370(a)(5) (mandating denial or revocation of
“schoolbus, school pupil activity bus, general public paratransit vehicle, or youth bus driver
certificate” based on violent felony conviction); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1218(b)(1)(b)
(mandating revocation of education license based on violent felony conviction).
211
LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:291(E)(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
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benefit to those who have been convicted of a nonviolent offense.212 Finally,
it might be noted that a violence conviction can even affect a person’s ability
to do volunteer work.213
2.

CVCs Relating to Privacy and Stigma

The formal legal restrictions on employment for violent offenders
complement the private discrimination of employers, as well as that of other
important private actors like landlords and lenders. Much research indicates
that individuals who have been convicted of violent crimes face biases that
are even stronger than those that normally result from a criminal record.214
Discrimination by private actors is enabled by the easy availability of
information about individuals’ criminal history215 and seemingly legitimized
when there is no official marker of rehabilitation to offset the stigma of a
conviction. As a result of various CVCs, these factors tend to be especially
problematic for violent offenders.
For instance, consider sealing and expungement laws. The specifics
vary widely from state to state, but these laws generally serve to conceal
certain conviction records from public access through official channels,
usually after a certain amount of time has passed since the conviction.216 In
many states, however, individuals convicted of crimes classified as “violent”
are simply precluded from taking advantage of whatever sealing or
expungement process exists in the state.217 Moreover, even when violent
212

Id. at § 47:287.752(A).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6647(b)(2)(a) (generally requiring denial of
membership in volunteer fire department if applicant has been convicted or released from
custodial confinement in past five years for “serious crime of violence”).
214
See, e.g., DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF
MASS INCARCERATION 124–25 (2007) (discussing survey of employers).
215
See NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 53 at 55 (discussing easy
availability of criminal records).
216
Id. at 57–59.
217
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1408(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July
1, 2018, Fiscal Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-306(5)(h) (2015);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1017(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018, Chs. 200–271);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-525A(5) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.); 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/3-3-2(a)(10)(D)(x) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100–607 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-3(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess. and 1st Special
Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.160(1) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 14,
2018); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 978(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018 1st
Extraordinary Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-27.1(c)(6)(i) (West,
Westlaw through legislation effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); CRIM. PROC. § 10105(a)(8)(i); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5(V) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 334 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.59(1)(a) (McKinney through L. 2018, Chs. 1 to 120); N.C. GEN.
213
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offenders are not categorically barred from these opportunities, they are apt
to face longer waiting periods before they can apply.218
A few states offer former offenders an opportunity to apply for a
certificate of rehabilitation or restoration of rights, which can help to offset
the stigma of a conviction.219 However, when the conviction is for an offense
classified as “violent,” the opportunity is often not available.220 Similarly,
the rules for executive pardons can also be less favorable for violent
offenders.221 And in one state that provides a process by which a person can
have a felony conviction reduced to a misdemeanor after a certain waiting
period, the statute specifically excludes anyone who is a “violent
offender.”222
These patterns also hold for juveniles. Traditionally, juvenile
delinquency adjudications have been treated as confidential matters and
shielded from public access so as to minimize the risk of long-term stigma
for the juvenile.223 However, if the adjudication is for an offense classified
as “violent,” the confidentiality protections may be much less or even
nonexistent.224
STAT. ANN. § 15A-145.5(c) (West, Westlaw through the end of 2017 Reg. Sess.); 12 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 12-1.3-2(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 112, Jan. 2018 Sess.); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 9.94A.640(2), 9.96.060(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through all effective legislation of
2018 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.015(1m)(a)(3) (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-131502(a)(iv)(A), 14-6-241(a) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Budget Sess.).
218
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1018(a) (setting forth various waiting periods for
expungement of juvenile records; longer waiting periods apply to violent offenses); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 179.245(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through end of 79th Reg. Sess. (2017)) (requiring
person convicted of violent crime to wait at least ten years before sealing).
219
See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 53, at 54 (describing New
York’s Certificates of Relief from Disabilities and Certificates of Good Conduct).
220
See MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 7-104(a)(1)(i) (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2(i) (West, Westlaw
through end of 2018 Reg. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-105(b).
221
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-124a(j)(2) (West, Westlaw through Public Acts
effective July 1, 2018) (establishing expedited pardons review process for applicants who were
convicted of nonviolent crime); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 638.02(2) (West, Westlaw through laws
effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.) (establishing ten-year waiting period for individuals
convicted of “crime of violence”; otherwise, waiting period is five years).
222
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-7(d)(1).
223
McMullen, supra note 88, at 9.
224
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827.6 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 119 of 2018 Reg.
Sess.) (establishing distinct rules for release of information regarding “minor alleged to have
committed a violent offense”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-304(5), (5.5) (2015) (requiring
notification of allegations of “crime of violence” to be given to juvenile’s school district and,
in some circumstances, school principal; permitting public release of certain information about
these cases); § 16-22-112(2)(b)(III) (permitting local law enforcement agencies to post on
their websites sex offender registration of a “juvenile with a second or subsequent adjudication
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One of the most powerful mechanisms by which sex offenders have
been stigmatized in recent years has been through registration and
community notification laws. These laws require sex offenders to provide
government authorities with regularly updated personal information,
including work and home addresses; this information is then shared through
public websites and by other means.225 Increasingly, such laws are now being
extended from sex to violent offenders,226 or being made more draconian
when a person has both a sex and a violence conviction.227

involving unlawful sexual behavior or for a crime of violence”); FLA. STAT. § 985.04 (4)(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring notification of school superintendent
when juvenile arrested for violent crime); § 985.047(2)(b) (requiring notice to law
enforcement of relocation of juvenile “who has been adjudicated or had adjudication
withheld” for violent crime); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 879(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through
2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (“All proceedings in a juvenile delinquency case involving a
crime of violence . . . shall be open to the public.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.171(9)(3)
(restricting electronic access to juvenile delinquency records, but making exception when
juvenile adjudicated delinquent for violent crime); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:36(II)
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 334 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (permitting court clerk to disclose
certain information regarding juvenile violent crime cases); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-301(A)
(“[L]aw-enforcement records concerning a juvenile . . . ] shall not be open to public inspection
nor their contents disclosed to the public unless a juvenile 14 years of age or older is charged
with a violent juvenile felony . . . .”); § 16.1-309.1(H) (requiring reporting to Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement of juvenile detained based on allegation of violent
felony if juvenile believed to be in United States illegally); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-243
(West, Westlaw through the 2018 Budget Sess.) (prohibiting court clerk from disclosing
names of juvenile offenders “unless the offender was adjudicated delinquent for commission
of a violent felony”).
225
Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Notification, ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE,
A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, at 397–98 (Erik Luna ed.).
226
See FLA. STAT. § 775.261(3)(a) (subjecting “career offender[s]” to registration and
notification provisions; (2)(a) defines “career offender” to include “any person who is
designated as a habitual violent felony offender, a violent career criminal, or a three-time
violent felony offender”); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-19(a) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d
Reg. Sess. and1st Special Sess.) (establishing general ten-year registration period for
individuals who qualify as “violent offender”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1513(1)(c) (West,
Westlaw through the 2017 Sess.) (authorizing court to order delinquent youth to register as
violent offender); § 46-23-504(1) (requiring “violent offender” to register within certain time
limitations); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 594(A) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective
July 1, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (establishing timing requirements under violent crime offenders
registration law); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.330(3)(c) (West, Westlaw through all effective
legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (requiring registration as part of sentence when person
convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, of felony firearm offense committed in
conjunction with “serious violent offense”).
227
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4121 (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2018, Chs. 200–
271) (excluding sex offenders from relief from registration requirement if they have prior
violent crime conviction).
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Many other CVCs have implications for privacy and stigma. For
instance, in several states, violent offenders are required to provide DNA
samples.228 Other CVCs affect the retention of criminal case records,229
require a special identifying code on drivers’ licenses,230 mandate the
disclosure of an applicant’s criminal history to a prospective residential care
home,231 and diminish the confidentiality of mental health records.232
3.

Parenting-Related CVCs

CVC laws can even affect parent-child relationships, with several states
prohibiting individuals with a violence conviction from adopting or
becoming a foster parent.233 Additionally, in some states, violent offenses are
recognized as a ground for terminating existing parental relationships.234
228

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-102.4(1)(b)(I)(C); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2504(a)(3)(i)(1) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective July 1, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-47-1(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 44-6-103(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through laws effective
June 30, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (West, Westlaw through end of
2018 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.84(ah) (2016).
229
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-2-204(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1,
2018, Fiscal Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.) (requiring police files for violent crimes to be
preserved permanently); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-213(C)(3) (requiring criminal case files
generally to be preserved for twenty years, but fifty years for a “violent felony” or “an act of
violence”).
230
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-148 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act 226).
231
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 321-15.3(1) (West, Westlaw through Act 115 of 2018 Reg.
Sess.).
232
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.02.260(1)(a)(ii)(B) (West, Westlaw through all effective
legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
233
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-116(c)-(d); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8908(c)(1) (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 119 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5(v-1) (West, Westlaw through
P.A. 100–607 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259A.10(4)(a)(1)(iv), 609B.445
(West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115d.3-a(b)(i)-(ii) (McKinney through L. 2018, Chs. 1 to 120); SOC. SERV. LAW § 378-a(2)(e);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-11.3-02 1(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-5.1(C)(4) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective July 1,
2018, 2d Reg. Sess.). CVCs can also affect one’s eligibility to serve as an emergency
placement for a child in need of protection, MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-304(6) (West, Westlaw
through the 2017 Sess.), or as a guardian, MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-114(a)(2)
(West, Westlaw through legislation effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); cf. LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 4231(C) (West, Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (disqualifying
parent with conviction for felony “crime of violence” from serving as minor child’s “tutor,” a
role in Louisiana law that is analogous to guardianship).
234
See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 42-2-608(1)(g); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through
Adjourned Sess. acts effective June 1, 2018). Similarly, California precludes state assistance
in reuniting a child with a parent or guardian if the parent or guardian has been convicted of
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Possession of Firearms and Similar Items

A large number of CVCs affect the ability of violent offenders to
possess firearms and other devices that are dangerous or could otherwise be
used to facilitate future crimes. Of course, under federal law, any felony
conviction results in a loss of the defendant’s right to possess a firearm. 235
However, when it comes to individuals who have been convicted of violent
offenses, state laws supplement this federal gun prohibition in a variety of
important ways. For instance, in several states, a violent misdemeanor results
in at least a temporary bar to gun possession,236 or affects the offender’s
eligibility for a concealed carry permit.237 Additionally, in some states, a
juvenile delinquency adjudication for a violent offense may also cause a loss
of gun rights.238 Indeed, in one state, it is enough that a person charged with
a violent offense has avoided conviction by virtue of a finding of insanity.239
In other states, a charge alone is enough to result in a loss of rights while the
case is pending.240 Additionally, in some states, the mechanisms that have

“violent felony.” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(12) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 119
of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
235
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
236
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 806-11(a); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-01(1)(b);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.470(1)(g) (West, Westlaw through April 13, 2018, Reg. Sess.).
Note that these state restrictions reach more broadly than the federal ban that is triggered by a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
237
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-308(a)(1)(A)-(B) (West, Westlaw through laws effective
July 1, 2018, Fiscal Sess. and 2d Extraordinary Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 790.06(3); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1379.3(C)(9) (West, Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 45-9-101(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.101(2)(4)
(West, Westlaw through emergency legislation approved June 1, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-2433(5) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective July 1, 2018, 2d
Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-4(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through end of 2018 2d Reg.
Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-415.12(b) (West, Westlaw through the end of 2017 Reg.
Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-04-03(1)(c)(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704(2)(a)(ii)
(West, Westlaw through 2018 Gen. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(c) (West, Westlaw
through the 2018 Budget Sess.).
238
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(d) (West, Westlaw through Act 115 of 2018 Reg.
Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(c)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 129B(1)(i)(C) (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 108 of 2018 2d Annual Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.245(b).
239
See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.470(1)(g).
240
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 806-11(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13(A)(2)
(West, Westlaw through File 84 of the 132d G.A. (2017–2018)); cf. LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1379.3(C)(10) (as condition for concealed carry permit, requiring that applicant “not be
charged under indictment or a bill of information for any crime of violence”); MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. SAFETY § 5-114(a)(1)(i) (requiring suspension of firearm dealer’s license if dealer under
indictment for violent crime); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(3) (barring concealed carry for
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been established for felons to regain gun rights are limited to only those with
nonviolent convictions.241 Violent offenders may also face enhanced
penalties when they violate gun laws.242
In addition to the loss of gun rights, violent offenders also face
restrictions on their ability to possess body armor,243 explosives,244 tasers,245
and self-defense spray.246 A violence conviction may also affect a person’s
right to own a dog247 or a snake,248 to possess radio equipment in his or her
car,249 to have tinted car windows,250 and to hunt with a bow and arrow. 251
5.

Other Collateral Consequences

A violence crime may carry many additional collateral consequences,
including those affecting a person’s ability to
 obtain government benefits,252

person facing violent offense charge); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1352(e) (West, Westlaw
through laws effective June 30, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (same).
241
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.165(1a) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1,
2018, Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-415.4(b).
242
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.132(C).
243
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31360 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 119 of 2018 Reg. Sess.);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.3.A(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-107 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective July 1, 2018,
Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227g(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 267-336
of 2018 Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1085(A) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act 226);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 938.3415, 941.291 (2016).
244
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1472.3(E)(2); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 11-107(b)(3)
(West, Westlaw through legislation effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 299F.77(1)(2) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-36-100(1)(b); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.74.360 (West, Westlaw through all effective
legislation of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
245
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-109.
246
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 122D(i)(C) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 108 of 2018
2dAnnual Sess.).
247
See GA. CODE ANN. § 4-8-27(f)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 955.54(A) (West, Westlaw through File 84 of the 132d G.A. (2017-2018));
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1363 (West, Westlaw through laws effective June 30, 2018, 2d
Reg. Sess.).
248
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 935.09(A)(3).
249
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.37(1)(a).
250
See LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:361.2(A)(3)(d)(i), 32:361.3(A) (West, Westlaw through
2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
251
See 20 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 20-13-5(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 112, Jan.
2018 Sess.).
252
See GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-184(a)(4); ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 3104(15) (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 317 of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
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obtain compensation for a wrongful conviction,253
obtain compensation as a crime victim,254
obtain legal aid,255
litigate a civil case,256 and
attend school.257

Finally, although this article focuses primarily on state CVCs, we
should note at least one major federal collateral consequence: the
Immigration and Nationality Act normally requires the deportation of aliens
who have been convicted of a “crime of violence.”258
F.

SYNTHESIS

In order to appreciate how CVCs can pile up, a hypothetical illustration
may help. Let’s focus on Maryland—a state that is by no means an extreme
outlier in its number of CVCs. “Carl,” our hypothetical subject, has his first
253

See FLA. STAT. § 961.04(1), (3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.).
See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.060 (West, Westlaw through all effective legislation of
2018 Reg. Sess.).
255
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 13303(b)(3)(A)(i) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 119 of
2018 Reg. Sess.).
256
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-313(c) (West, Westlaw through laws effective June 30,
2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (permitting evidence of witness’s violent felony conviction to be
introduced for impeachment in civil case); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.645 (West, Westlaw
through legislation effective 2018 Reg. Sess.) (requiring violent offenders to obtain special
permission before initiating civil action against victim or victim’s family).
257
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-101.3(F)(1) (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective July 1, 2018, 2d Reg. Sess.) (relieving public schools of duty to “provide education
services in the regular school setting” to student who has been convicted or adjudicated as
delinquent for violent crime). Similarly, in Texas, students below third grade can be placed in
out-of-school suspension for committing a violent offense. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 37.005(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through the end of 2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sess.).
258
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (providing for deportation of aliens convicted
of “aggravated felony”); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012) (including “crime of violence . . .
for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year” within the definition of “aggravated
felony”). The Supreme Court has found similar vagueness problems here as it did with the
ACCA. Session v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018). More specifically, the Court struck
down one part of the relevant statutory definition of “crime of violence,” the so-called
“residual clause” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). However, another portion of the definition,
the “elements clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), was not affected by Dimaya. See 138 S. Ct. at
1211 (“Section 16(b), the residual clause, is the part of the statute at issue in this case.”). Thus,
the deportation CVC remains part of federal law, albeit with a somewhat narrower reach.
Further as to deportation, in California, law enforcement agencies are prohibited from
providing certain types of cooperation to immigration authorities, but an exception is
recognized as to individuals who have been convicted of a violent felony. CAL. GOV. CODE
§ 7282.5(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 119 of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
254
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entanglement with the criminal justice system at age sixteen when he and two
other friends impulsively decide to steal a classmate’s new smartphone;
Carl’s friends hold the victim while Carl snatches the phone. However, a
school security officer observes the altercation and arrests the perpetrators.
Carl is then prosecuted and convicted of robbery as an adult.259 He is
sentenced to a short term of confinement.
Due in part to the disruptions caused by his confinement, Carl drops out
of high school and starts to use drugs. He then becomes involved in selling
in order to support his own habit. At age nineteen, he experiences his second
arrest, this time for distribution of a small amount of cocaine. This is a wakeup call for Carl, who realizes he needs to get treatment for his addiction. His
lawyer discusses the possibility of a diversion with the prosecutor. Maryland
law does provide prosecutors with an option to dismiss charges conditioned
on the defendant’s undergoing drug treatment.260 However, Carl is not
eligible because he has a conviction for a “crime of violence” in the past five
years.261 The new case thus moves forward, and Carl is convicted. He is
again sentenced to a short stint behind bars, where his drug problems go
unaddressed.
Upon release, Carl looks for work, but struggles to find anything
because of his criminal record. He ends up in a dead-end, minimum-wage
job. After a few months of trying to stay on the straight and narrow, he falls
back into old associations and starts using drugs again. He also moves in
with a girlfriend, and they have a child. It is hard to make ends meet.
Knowing of a “fence” who will pay a decent price for stolen goods, Carl
is always on the lookout for theft opportunities in his neighborhood. One
evening, he notices a man and woman leaving their home with a young child.
The house appears to be dark and empty. He decides to slip around back to
see if he can gain entry. There is an unlocked door. Looking around inside,
Carl finds a jewelry box in a bedroom, which he takes. Just then, however,
the family unexpectedly returns. Carl ends up in a tussle with the man,
eventually shoving him aside to get away. The woman recognizes Carl from

259

See MD. CODE ANN., COURTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-03(d)(4)(vi) (West, Westlaw
through legislation effective June 1, 2018, from the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (indicating that robbery
charge against sixteen-year-old cannot be prosecuted in juvenile court without order of
removal).
260
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-229(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through legislation
effective June 1, 2018, from the 2018 Reg. Sess.).
261
§ 6-229(a)(2). The statute indicates that the relevant definition of “crime of violence”
is found in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, which includes robbery. MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. Law § 14-101(a)(9) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective June 1, 2018, from
the 2018 Reg. Sess.).
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the neighborhood, though, and is able to provide information to the police
that leads to his arrest. Carl once again faces a robbery charge.
Unlike in his earlier cases, Carl finds that he is unable to gain pretrial
release. With a current charge and a prior conviction for a “crime of
violence,” Carl is subject under Maryland law to a presumption that, if
released, he will “flee and pose a danger to another person or the
community.”262 The judge thus denies his request for bail.
Despite this setback, Carl is initially determined to fight the charge. The
jewelry box was never recovered, and Carl is optimistic that he can develop
an alibi defense with the help of his girlfriend. He calls her from jail to tell
her what she should say. When she expresses reluctance about lying, he
threatens to “slap some sense” into her the next time he sees her.
Unfortunately for Carl, the phone conversation is recorded by jail officials,
who turn the tape over to the prosecutor.
The prosecutor is exasperated with Carl, first for trying to fight the
charge and then for attempting to induce false testimony. She decides to
throw the proverbial book at him. For an unarmed robbery, Carl would
normally face a sentence of up to fifteen years in prison, with no minimum. 263
But the prosecutor is able to inflate his sentencing exposure in three different
ways based on the fact that robbery counts as a “crime of violence.” First,
she charges him as a “subsequent offender”: since this would be Carl’s
second conviction for a crime of violence and since he served a term of
confinement for the first, he is subject to a subsequent offender statute that
includes a mandatory minimum prison term of ten years.264 Second, upon
notice by the prosecutor, he is subject to an additional sentence enhancement
for committing a crime of violence knowing “that a minor who is at least 2
years old is present in a residence.”265 This increases the maximum potential
sentence for Carl by five years.266 Finally, Carl is charged with obstruction
of justice. The normal maximum penalty for attempting to induce false
testimony through threats of harm is five years, but the exposure balloons to
twenty years if the underlying offense that is being covered up counts as a
“crime of violence.”267 In sum, Carl now faces a minimum of ten years and
a maximum of forty years.
As the weeks drag by and Carl remains stuck in jail, he learns that he
has been fired from his job, that his girlfriend has moved in with another man,
262
263
264
265
266
267

CRIM. PROC. § 5-202(c)(3).
CRIM. LAW § 3-402(b).
§ 14-101(d).
§ 3-601.1(a)(1).
§ 3-601.1(b).
§ 9-302(c).
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and that he has been evicted from his apartment. Despondent and cowed by
the enormous potential sentence hanging over his head, Carl instructs his
lawyer that he is ready to plead guilty to practically anything; “let’s just get
it over with.” Ultimately, the prosecutor agrees to drop the other
enhancements if Carl pleads guilty to robbery and obstruction of justice. The
deal completed, the judge imposes concurrent prison terms of twelve years
on each count, with four years of each sentence suspended, leaving an initial
confinement period of eight years.
Normally, a Maryland inmate is eligible for parole release after serving
one-quarter of the confinement term, or, in Carl’s case, two years.268
However, when a prisoner has been sentenced for a violent crime, he or she
must wait until at least half the term for the violent crime has been served.269
That would put off Carl’s eligibility for another two years. Additionally,
while other prisoners can take advantage of an expedited administrative
release process once they reach the parole eligibility threshold, Carl would
be precluded from this by virtue of his prior conviction for a violent crime. 270
Moreover, while most Maryland prisoners can earn a right to early release
through “diminution credits,”271 which are based on good conduct and
participation in work and rehabilitative programs,272 violent offenders like
Carl accrue these credits at a much reduced rate.273 As a result of all of these
various CVCs, Carl will likely have to serve a much larger percentage of his
prison term than is typical for those inmates who are not in the violent
category.
Once Carl finally does gain release from prison to community
supervision, his life may still be affected in important ways by additional
CVCs. He would be excluded from the opportunity to reduce his period of
supervision through “earned compliance credits.”274 Additionally, while
268
MD. CODE ANN., CORRECTIONAL SERVS. § 7-301(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective June 1, 2018, from the 2018 Reg. Sess.).
269
§ 7-301(c)(1)(i).
270
§ 7-301.1(a)(3)(iii).
271
§ 7-501(a).
272
§ 3-704-07.
273
Carl would gain credit for good conduct at a rate of only five days per month, as
opposed to the general rate of ten days per month. § 3-704(b). He would similarly earn credits
for participating in work and rehabilitative programs at a reduced rate. § 3-707(a)(2)(i).
Additionally, Maryland law specifies that violent offenders cannot use diminution credits to
obtain release prior to their parole eligibility. § 7-501(a).
274
See § 6-117(a)(4)(ii), (c)(1) (defining “supervised individual” to exclude individuals
convicted for a “crime of violence”; “the Maryland Parole Commission or the court shall
adjust the period of a supervised individual’s supervision on the recommendation of the
Division of Parole and Probation for earned compliance credits accrued under a program
created under this section”).
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most offenders who are revoked and returned to prison get sentence credit
for the time they have spent on community supervision, an individual is
denied this credit if he or she was serving a sentence for a violent crime and
revoked due to a finding of a new violent crime.275
And then there are the employment consequences. For instance, Carl
could not be hired to work in a school by virtue of his conviction for a crime
of violence.276 Moreover, while Maryland generally prohibits the denial of
an occupational license based solely on an applicant’s criminal record, this
sort of categorical official discrimination is permitted when the applicant’s
record includes a crime of violence.277
Carl may do well in prison and during his subsequent community
supervision, perhaps finally getting the drug treatment he needs, obtaining a
GED, and acquiring new job skills. He may never commit another crime for
as long as he lives. However, his violence convictions will prove difficult, if
not impossible, ever to fully leave behind. There is no mechanism under
Maryland law for him to have his record sealed or expunged. There is an
opportunity for some former offenders in the state to gain an official
“certificate of rehabilitation,” but this is closed to Carl because of his
violence conviction.278 The statute’s statement of legislative purpose is
telling: “It is the policy of the State to encourage the employment of
nonviolent ex-offenders and remove barriers to their ability to demonstrate
fitness for occupational licenses or certifications required by the State.”279 It
is not clear, though, why the state should be any less interested in supporting
the rehabilitation of people like Carl.
IV. CONCERNS WITH CVCS
Broadly speaking, the normative concerns regarding CVCs fall into
three categories: fair notice, proportionality, and efficacy. Although a full
consideration of these concerns lies beyond the scope of this article, the basic
points emerge in a straightforward way from our survey of the CVC
labyrinth.

275

§ 7-401(3).
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 6-113(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective
June 1, 2018, from the 2018 Reg. Sess.).
277
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 1-209(b) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective
June 1, 2018, from the 2018 Reg. Sess.).
278
MD. CODE ANN., CORRECTIONAL SERVS. § 7-104(a)(1)(i) (West, Westlaw through
legislation effective June 1, 2018, from the 2018 Reg. Sess.).
279
§ 7-104(b).
276
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A. FAIR NOTICE

Fair notice has been at the center of the constitutional controversy
surrounding one CVC, the federal Armed Career Criminal Act. A portion of
the statutory definition of “violent felony” in that law was so indeterminate
that the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional—defendants lacked fair
warning as to whether their prior convictions could be used to trigger the
ACCA’s fifteen-year mandatory minimum.280 Yet, as we saw in Part I above,
vague language echoing that found in the federal law also appears in a great
many state CVC statutes—sometimes constituting the whole of the definition
of what counts as a violent crime, sometimes appearing in a residual clause
in a hybrid definition, and sometimes used even in laundry-list statutes in
order to cover out-of-state convictions.281
Moreover, indeterminate definitional language constitutes only one
dimension of the fair-notice problem. Even when a definition is clear on its
face—e.g., in the statutes that simply list a set of criminal code citations as
the meaning of violent crime—this seeming clarity is of little value to
defendants who do not even suspect that the statute exists and needs to be
consulted. Moreover, concerns should be heightened in light of the
unexpectedly broad reach of many CVCs, which can be triggered by offenses
that are not normally considered violent, by misdemeanors, by juvenile
adjudications, by charges alone, by findings of not guilty by reason of
insanity, by expunged convictions, and by very old convictions.
Nor can counsel be counted on to provide defendants with adequate
notice. For one thing, the typically overstretched, under-resourced defense
lawyer may not even be aware of all of the potential consequences of a
conviction—an unfortunate reality that the Supreme Court has had to
confront in a recent line of cases on the constitutional right to effective

280

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
To be sure, the similarity between the ACCA’s unconstitutional residual clause and the
language found in many state statutes does not necessarily mean that the state laws must also
be overturned on vagueness grounds. Indeed, in dicta in Johnson, the Court suggested two
considerations that might serve to distinguish the ACCA from its state counterparts. First, in
the ACCA, in contrast to most of the state enactments, the qualitative definitional language is
linked to a “confusing list of examples.” Id. at 2561. Second, while the ACCA requires courts
to determine categorically whether an offense fits within the residual clause, most of its state
counterparts permit a case-by-case determination of whether a person committed an offense
in a way that fits the relevant qualitative definition. Id. However, even though state qualitative
definitional language may pass constitutional muster, that does not necessarily eliminate
notice concerns. Notice may be sufficient in the minimal way that the Constitution requires,
but still fall short of fairness in a more practical sense.
281
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assistance of counsel.282 For another, many CVCs are applied retroactively
to old convictions; even the most diligent lawyer cannot be expected to
predict the as-yet-unenacted consequences that will follow from a
conviction.283
B. PROPORTIONALITY

While proportionality in punishment—that is, making the punishment
fit the crime—has long been recognized as an important overriding objective
for the criminal justice system,284 CVCs operate contrary to this goal by
imposing the same consequences in an indiscriminate fashion on a wide array
of dissimilar offenses. Given the obvious practical and ethical difficulties of
“eye-for-an-eye” proportionality, most contemporary punishment theorists
favor ordinal over cardinal conceptions of proportionality.285 On this view,
proportionality is achieved by ensuring that the relative severity of
punishment for different offenses corresponds to the relative severity of the
offense. Thus, all else being equal, murder sentences should be longer than
aggravated assault sentences, aggravated assault sentences longer than
simple assault sentences, and so forth. Yet, CVCs tend to have a leveling
effect, diminishing or potentially even erasing the practical differences in the
severity of sanctions for quite different offenses. The broader the definition
of “violent crime” and the more severe the consequences that flow from it,
the more likely it is that proportionality will be undermined.
282
See Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2017) (holding that defendant entitled
to relief based on lawyer’s failure to advise him that guilty plea would result in deportation);
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010) (holding that lawyer provided constitutionally
deficient assistance in failing to advise defendant of deportation consequence of guilty plea).
283
The Ex Post Facto Clause imposes few constraints on CVC retroactivity. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (upholding the sex offender registration law against
Ex Post Facto challenge because not punitive); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998)
(“An enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender thus ‘is not to be viewed as either a
new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes’ but as ‘a stiffened penalty for the
latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.’”
(quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)).
284
See, e.g., Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just
Punishment,” 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 892 (2002) (“[T]hat punishment should be in some way
proportional to the crime is an intuition (like the wrong of punishing the innocent) that is so
widely shared as to make its attack unpersuasive.”). As a theoretical matter, the proportionality
principle is most closely associated with retributive approaches to punishment, but some
scholars have also defended proportionality on utilitarian grounds. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1997) (arguing that
desert-based sentences enhance public respect for the legal system and thereby promote
utilitarian crime-control objectives).
285
Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1255 (2011).

230

O'HEAR

[Vol. 109

Consider, for instance, that Maryland ten-year mandatory minimum for
a second “crime of violence.”286 Carl, our hypothetical offender from Part
III, was subject—but for a plea deal—to this ten-year sentence on the basis
of two unarmed robberies resulting in no physical injuries, at least one of
which arguably should be regarded as quite low in culpability because of his
age at the time (sixteen). An older two-time armed robber who created far
greater danger and caused far more harm would face the same minimum.
Even more stark violations of the proportionality principle are not hard to
imagine, especially in connection with the most expansive CVCs that lump
together core violent offenses with property or drug offenses, felonies with
misdemeanors, adult convictions with juvenile adjudications, and so forth.
Moreover, while we normally think of proportionality in relation to the
length of prison terms, the impact of collateral consequences should not be
disregarded—these can severely constrain life prospects for many years after
the completion of a sentence. Indeed, with probation and relatively short jail
terms the norm even in most felony cases,287 collateral consequences may
prove to be the sanctions that are the most significant to many defendants
over the long run. When these sanctions are distributed indiscriminately on
the basis of broad definitions of violent crime, proportionality may be
seriously undermined.
Another dimension of the proportionality problem relates to the risk of
wrongful convictions. In a sense, wrongful convictions represent the most
extreme form of disproportionality—after all, any punishment would be
more severe than what the wrongfully convicted defendant deserves.
Unfortunately, CVCs can significantly increase the risk that an innocent
person will be convicted, especially via a guilty plea. Our Maryland
hypothetical illustrates the key dynamics: protracted pretrial detention, which
can result from the operation of a CVC, can leave a defendant desperate for
resolution of his or her case—even if that means pleading guilty to a crime
that he or she did not commit—while the inflated sentencing exposure
created by other CVCs can also dramatically escalate the pressure on a
defendant to accept practically any plea deal that is offered without regard to
guilt.288 In the hypothetical, we assumed that Carl was indeed guilty of the
286

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101(d) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective
June 1, 2018, Reg. Sess.).
287
See, e.g., BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 — STATISTICAL TABLES 29 (2013) (estimating that 33% of defendants
convicted of a felony in large urban counties in 2009 received a jail sentence, while 25%
received probation or another nonincarcerative sentence).
288
Although it can be hard for laypeople to accept that an innocent person would ever
plead guilty, there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence that this does happen. For a discussion
of illustrative cases, see John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually
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second robbery, but, if the eyewitness identification of him as the perpetrator
had been mistaken, there is little assurance that he would have reached any
more favorable of an outcome.
C. EFFICACY

CVCs are adopted primarily in the name of public safety,289 but their
severity and tendencies to overbreadth raise concerns about their efficacy.
Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, it is important to appreciate that
individuals who have been convicted of violent offenses—even of core
violent offenses like rape and robbery—are not categorically more dangerous
than other offenders. Consider the data on prisoner recidivism. The United
States Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) tracked the
performance of prisoners released in thirty states in 2005.290 Dividing the
prisoners into four categories (violent, property, drug, and public order), the
BJS found that those who had been convicted of violent crimes actually had
the lowest rates of reconviction for a new offense.291

Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (2014). Indeed, about 18%
of recorded exonerations have come in guilty-plea cases. Jenia I. Turner, Plea Bargaining, in
3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 73, 83 (Erik Luna ed.,
2017). Moreover, empirical research is making increasingly clear that pretrial detention does
create especially strong pressures for defendants to accept whatever plea deal is available. For
instance, one recent study from New York City concludes:
We find that pretrial detention increases the probability that a felony defendant will be
convicted by at least 13 percentage points. . . . The increase in conviction rates is driven
by detainees accepting plea deals more frequently. We also find evidence that detention
increases minimum sentence length. In addition, individuals who are detained pretrial
are less likely to obtain a reduction in the severity of the crimes with which they are
charged.
Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case
Outcomes: Evidence From New York City Arraignments, 60 J. L. & ECON. 529, 531–32 (2017).
289
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.12 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 2d Reg. Sess.) (“It is
the finding of the Legislature that the population of violent offenders released from state prison
into the community poses the greatest threat to the public safety of the groups of offenders
under community supervision.”).
290
MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER & HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO
2010 (2014).
291
See id. at 15 (indicating that five-year reconviction rate for violent offenders was 48%;
for property offenders, 61.2%; for drug offenders, 56.3%; and for public order offenders,
54.2%). In addition to reconviction, the BJS study also reported results for five other measures
of recidivism. Id. at 8, 15. Violent offenders had the lowest repeat-offending rate using each
of these measures.
To be sure, not all new offenses are equally concerning. If offenders tend to specialize in
certain types of crime, then we might still want to undertake special measures in order to
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Because many of the individuals who are affected by CVCs are not
high-risk offenders, there are good reasons to fear that many of the special
measures intended to prevent them from reoffending may actually be
counterproductive. For instance, research increasingly points to the
likelihood that incarceration is criminogenic—that is, it increases recidivism
risk—for many offenders.292 Thus, to the extent that CVC laws are leading
to the incarceration of low- and medium-risk individuals who could have
been safely supervised in the community, these laws may be causing some
of the offenders to become greater threats to public safety over the long run.
Recall, too, that some CVCs involve the categorical exclusion of “violent”
offenders from drug treatment courts and other rehabilitative programs that
could help to reduce risk.293 These laws further increase the likelihood that
CVCs may have an overall negative impact of public safety.
Moreover, to the extent that CVCs make it harder for the affected
individuals to obtain employment, housing, and the like, this may also serve
to increase their risk. Unemployment and homelessness are known to be
recidivism risk factors for returning prisoners.294 While there has been
limited research to date on the effect of collateral consequences on
recidivism, some studies do point to a correlation between repeat-offending
and some consequences, including employment restrictions.295
Other efficacy concerns flow from the fair-notice and proportionality
problems discussed above. If CVC statutes aim to deter, they cannot do so
effectively if individuals are not aware of the legal threats they face under
these laws. Disproportionality, for its part, contributes to perceptions that the

address the recidivism risks of those who have been convicted of violent crimes. Yet, the BJS
data reveal little evidence of specialization. For instance, among the prisoners convicted of
violent crimes who recidivated, public order offenses were far more common than fresh
violent offenses. MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER & HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005
TO 2010—SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES: MOST SERIOUS COMMITMENT OFFENSE AND TYPES OF POSTRELEASE ARREST CHARGES OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005, tbl. 2 (2016). Indeed,
violent recidivism was almost as common among the prisoners convicted of property and
public order offenses as it was among those convicted of violent crimes. Id.
292
COMM. ON CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 193–95 (2014).
293
See supra Part III.A.2.
294
Susan Turner, Reentry, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT,
INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 341, 350, 355 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
295
Tanya N. Whittle, Felony Collateral Sanctions Effects on Recidivism: A Literature
Review, 29 (5) CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 505, *7, *14 (forthcoming).
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law and legal system are unfair; such perceptions can diminish respect for
law and thereby undercut efforts to promote law-abidingness.296
No one would question that reducing the risk of violent recidivism is a
salutary public-policy objective, but CVCs are a fundamentally misguided
risk-reduction strategy. The fact that a person has been convicted of this or
that particular offense, even if on more than one occasion, is a poor proxy for
risk—especially when no consideration is given to other factors like the
person’s age at the time of conviction and the amount of time that has elapsed
since the last conviction. Better risk-assessment tools are available.297 If
such tools were utilized to implement risk-control measures in more narrowly
targeted ways, then better public-safety outcomes could likely be achieved at
much less cost to offenders, their families, and society as a whole.
CONCLUSION: NEXT STEPS
CVCs have slowly accumulated in an ad hoc fashion in many state codes
over a period of decades with no real attention to their coherence or overall
impact. A reevaluation of these laws is long overdue.
A good next step would be for each state to build on the work of this
article and develop a thorough catalog of its own CVCs, including—as well
as can be ascertained—the full reach of its particular definition (or
definitions) of violent crime. Although I have tried to identify all of the
pertinent statutes in each state, a more complete catalog would also include
administrative regulations, court rules, and federal law.298 A state that has a
sentencing commission might give the cataloging task to that body,
recognizing that most CVCs either directly affect sentences or otherwise
have an important bearing on the overall severity of punishment.299 States
296
See Robinson & Darley, supra note 284, at 478 (“[E]very deviation from a desert
distribution [of punishment] can incrementally undercut the criminal law’s moral credibility,
which in turn can undercut its ability to help in the creation and internalization of norms and
its power to gain compliance by its moral authority.”).
297
For instance, a leading tool for assessing violent recidivism risk is the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide (VRAG). In its first iteration, the VRAG was developed by psychological
researchers based on an analysis of about fifty variables and more than 600 offenders. GRANT
T. HARRIS ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 123, 125 (3d ed.
2015). Using multiple regression analysis to identify the variables with the greatest predictive
power, the researchers ultimately developed a twelve-item instrument that includes not only
criminal history, but also several psychosocial and other variables. Id. at 126–27. Subsequent
research has confirmed that higher VRAG scores are indeed correlated with violent
recidivism. Id. at 135.
298
It might also be helpful to include in the catalog those consequences, omitted here, that
specifically attach to “sexual violence,” “domestic violence,” and “gang violence.”
299
Cf. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1175, 1215 (2014) (recommending that existing sentencing commissions be given the
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without a sentencing commission might find another existing agency with
suitable expertise or create a special task force for this purpose.
A full catalog of CVCs might have benefits on two levels. First, the
catalog would help to give practitioners a better awareness of the
consequences of particular charges and convictions. This might diminish
some of the fair-notice concerns with CVCs, as defense lawyers would be
more easily able to identify pertinent consequences and convey the
information to their clients. Conscientious judges might also do the same,
for instance, before accepting a defendant’s guilty plea. Moreover, with
better information, prosecutors and judges could potentially exercise their
power so as to avoid disproportionately severe outcomes. Prosecutors
routinely make charging and plea-bargaining decisions that have important
implications for CVCs, but they are not necessarily aware of all of those
implications, especially as to corrections and collateral consequences—not
matters over which prosecutors normally have direct responsibility. Judges
are also apt to have significant gaps in their knowledge of these matters. A
comprehensive catalog of CVCs could thus usefully inform the work of both
of these key decision-makers.
Second, the catalog might also support policy reform. At a minimum,
when new CVCs are proposed, it might help for policymakers to know the
full weight of existing consequences. More ambitiously, one might hope that
this information would spur a critical evaluation of current arrangements.
Indeed, the body charged with creating the catalog might also be asked to
supply reform recommendations.
Laying out a detailed reform agenda lies beyond the scope of this
Article, but a number of possibilities seem to flow from the concerns
sketched in Part IV above.300 These possibilities include:
 Imposing time limits on the capacity of a conviction to trigger a CVC,
preferably in the range of five to ten years after release from
incarceration;
 Removing juvenile adjudications as a potential trigger of CVCs;
 Eliminating purely qualitative definitions of violent crime;
 Confining the definition of violent crime to the core assaultive
felonies that are most clearly suggested by the term “violent”; and

responsibility for taking stock of each state’s “legal financial obligations,” that is, fines, fees,
and so forth).
300
These reform ideas suggested here are further developed in a forthcoming article. See
O’Hear, supra note 17.
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 Establishing a process by which a person can obtain relief from a
CVC by showing that the consequence is not appropriate in light of
the degree and nature of the risk that he or she actually presents.
Is policy reform actually feasible? Violent offenders suffer deep stigma
in our society, and elected officials will surely be reluctant to do anything
that is seen as giving them a break. That is, of course, the very political
dynamic that has driven the creation of CVCs. On the other hand, drug
offenders were also deeply stigmatized not so long ago, but have benefitted
from an extraordinary wave of reforms since 2000, including a vast
proliferation of diversion opportunities, the repeal or narrowing of many
mandatory minimums, and even the full-on legalization of marijuana in
several states.301 The basic argument in favor of such reforms has been that
harshly punitive responses to drug use and distribution are both ineffective
and very expensive, especially insofar as they have contributed to swollen
prison budgets.302 Yet, despite all of the changes in the way that drug crime
is being handled in the United States, the nation’s overall incarceration rate
remains little reduced from its peak level of a decade ago.303 In effect, much
of the cost-saving from reduced drug-crime imprisonment has been offset by
the impact of increased violent-crime imprisonment.304 If policymakers wish
to continue their efforts to reduce incarceration rates and corrections budgets,
they will almost inevitably be led to reconsider the way that the law treats
individuals who have been convicted of violent crimes—including through
that messy network of CVCs that not only inflates the punishment of these
individuals, but that also diminishes their prospects for rehabilitation.

301

For a more detailed account of this surprising history, see O’HEAR, supra note 22, ch.

2.
302

See, e.g., id. at 46 (noting arguments made in support of reforms in New York,
Michigan, and California).
303
Id. at xv.
304
O’HEAR, supra note 22, at 173.
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